

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents



POLICE EXECUTIVE
RESEARCH FORUM

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The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents

March 2014



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Contents

Acknowledgments.....	i
Introduction	1
Analysis of 84 Active Shooter Incidents Since 2000	3
Variations Found in Policies on Active Shooter Response.....	8
<i>Sidebar: Characteristics of Active Shooters.....</i>	<i>9</i>
The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents, and Changes in Officer Training.....	16
<i>Sidebar: January 2014 Shooting in Maryland Shopping Mall Tested Capabilities of Howard County Police</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Sidebar: Police and Fire Departments in Arlington County, VA Create Rescue Task Forces to Speed Medical Care.....</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Sidebar: Shooting at the Washington Navy Yard— D.C. Metropolitan Police Department: Identified Issues and Challenges</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Sidebar: Takeaways and Suggestions.....</i>	<i>28</i>
Preventing the Next Active Shooter Incident	29
What Police Should Tell the Community	37
Conclusion.....	40
Resources.....	41
About the Police Executive Research Forum.....	43
About Motorola Solutions and the Motorola Solutions Foundation.....	45
Appendix: Participants at the PERF Summit— “The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents”	46



Acknowledgments

IN THE SUMMER OF 2012, FOLLOWING THE mass shooting event at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, PERF decided to conduct a “Critical Issues in Policing” project on the topic of active shooters.

During the fall months, PERF was conducting research and preparing for a national Summit where police chiefs and others would discuss the changes in policies, training, and strategies that have resulted from the onset of active-shooter incidents.

Then, on December 14, the nation got word of a new active shooting incident, in Newtown, Connecticut, which was one of the most horrific of all of these heinous crimes, because most of the victims were very young children. We held our Summit in February 2013, and the shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown was fresh in everyone’s minds, as we discussed the approaches to these incidents that are detailed in this report.

PERF is grateful to the Motorola Solutions Foundation for its generous support of the Critical Issues in Policing series. Once again, our colleagues at Motorola have provided PERF with the flexibility to take on the most difficult issues in policing as the issues emerge. PERF’s partnership with the Motorola Solutions Foundation has resulted in many of PERF’s most significant projects in the areas of research and policy development.

Specifically, I want to thank Greg Brown, Chairman and CEO of Motorola Solutions; Mark Moon, Executive Vice President and President, Sales and Product Operations; Jim Welch, Senior Vice President, Americas Region; Domingo Herraiz, Vice President, North America Government Affairs; and Matt Blakely, Director of the Motorola Solutions Foundation. Our friend Rick Neal, recently retired from Motorola Solutions, played a key role in getting this project off the ground.

I also want to thank all of the PERF members and other experts who participated in our Active Shooter Summit on February 13, 2013. Special thanks go to the police chiefs who have experienced active shooter incidents, including Aurora Chief Dan Oates, Colonel Danny Stebbins of the Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the lead agency investigating the Sandy Hook mass shooting, Howard County, MD Chief William McMahon, who led the response to a shopping mall shooting in January 2014, and Chief Cathy Lanier of Washington, D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department, which responded to the Washington Navy Yard mass shooting incident in September 2013.

Chief Terry Gainer, U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms, U.S. Capitol Police Chief Kim Dine, and my former Executive Assistant Tam Vieth, who is now with Customs and Border Protection, deserve special thanks. They arranged for our Summit to be held in the historic “Senate Caucus Room” in the Russell Senate Office Building. (This room, pictured on the cover of this report, has served as the site of some of the most dramatic Senate hearings for more than 100 years, including hearings on the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, the Teapot Dome Scandal in 1923, the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954, and the Watergate investigation in 1973.)

We are also grateful to Prof. Pete Blair of Texas State University, who made two important presentations at our Summit. In the first, he shared the results of groundbreaking research that he and his colleagues have conducted on 84 active shooting incidents between 2000 and 2010. Professor Blair’s research is especially informative because it was conducted from a law enforcement perspective. And in his second presentation, Professor Blair discussed how police can educate the public about how to protect themselves if they are ever present at an


active shooter situation.

And thanks to PERF members who provided us with copies of their active shooter policies, training protocols, videos, PowerPoints, and other information. These documents provided important perspectives on the actual practices of police agencies, in an area that has been changing since the Columbine shooting of 1999 and is continuing to evolve with each new mass shooting incident.

Finally, I want to thank the PERF staff members who worked on this project, starting with my Chief of Staff, Andrea Luna, and PERF's former Director of Program Development, Sheryl Goldstein. Andrea has been leading Motorola Solutions Foundation projects for many years, and Sheryl provided strong support on this one, along with Deputy Chief of Staff Shannon Branly. Sunny Schnitzer, Balinda

Cockrell, Jacob Berman, Chris Coghill, and Rachel Freeland conducted background research and gathered information from PERF chiefs, and helped to organize the PERF Summit. Kit Lau and Jennifer Brooks also provided logistical support. Communications Director Craig Fischer wrote this report with assistance from Gregory Newman. Craig pulls together materials from many sources and writes one coherent and readable story. I am grateful for his insights and determination to make this publication one of PERF's most important and useful reports. James McGinty was our photographer, and PERF's talented and meticulous graphic designer, Dave Williams, produced this document.

I hope you will find that this report provides useful information about this critically important topic in policing.



Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

“Columbine was a wake-up call.”
—Montgomery County, MD Police Chief Thomas Manger

IN 1999, THE UNITED STATES WAS SHOCKED when two students at Columbine High School in Colorado shot and killed 12 students and one teacher, injured 24 more, and then killed themselves. The Columbine shooting was hardly the first major incident of violence in the United States, but for a number of reasons, Columbine was particularly distressing, and it captured the attention of the American people.

First, unlike other high-profile crimes with multiple victims, the Columbine massacre did not involve criminals whose motive was financial profit, terrorists trying to obtain the release of their imprisoned brethren, or political radicals or zealots. The Columbine shooters’ motivations were not the motives of “traditional” criminals.

Furthermore, the Columbine shootings shocked the nation because they hit close to home for people who were not accustomed to worrying about violent crime. Columbine was an upper-middle-class suburban high school with a high graduation rate, and large majorities of Columbine graduates went on to college. Thus, unlike the case with many other types of crime, average Americans could not look at the Columbine shooting and dismiss it as something that could never happen in their community.

Because the Columbine incident was something new, it prompted new thinking by police departments about how they should respond. More than a decade later, this process of developing new police policies, practices, and training for “active shooter” events is continuing.



Montgomery County, MD Police Chief
Thomas Manger

In the Columbine incident, police from various Denver-area agencies responded but did not enter the school to stop the shooters for more than 30 minutes. That reflected their training, which was based on the concepts of containing the situation and waiting for SWAT team members to arrive, mobilize, and respond.

This type of training reflected the thinking at the time. And it was appropriate for hostage incidents or other scenarios in which it made sense to wait for a SWAT team to respond, because SWAT

personnel are better equipped and trained in special tactics than are patrol officers. However, Columbine did not involve hostage takers; it involved two youths intent on quickly killing people at random. Columbine brought a realization by law enforcement leaders that a much faster response was needed for active-shooter incidents.

Columbine brought about a sea change in police tactics. “Contain and negotiate” may be appropriate for hostage incidents or situations where a person is barricaded in a room and unable to harm victims. But it is not appropriate for active shooter incidents. Columbine resulted in new approaches in which patrol officers are being trained to respond to active shooters as quickly as possible.

These new policies undoubtedly have saved many lives. Following is how the Associated Press described one of the most recent events, an attack at a supermarket in Elkhart, Indiana on Jan. 15, 2014:

A deadly shooting at an Indiana grocery store could have been much worse if not for the quick actions of two police officers who relied on training that has become commonplace since the 1999 Columbine shootings. Cody Skipper and Jason Tripp arrived at the Elkhart store within three minutes and needed less than 60 seconds to fatally shoot a gunman who had killed two people and was threatening a third.¹

These new approaches to active shooter events have not been easy to implement, and difficult issues have arisen in connection with active-shooter protocols.

For example, a faster response is more dangerous to responding officers. Patrol officers who quickly move to confront an active shooter face a high likelihood of being shot themselves.

In addition, active shooter incidents are dangerous, uncertain, and quickly changing. Specialized teams such as SWAT units receive complex tactical training in how to respond to dynamic situations with many moving parts. It is difficult to shrink this type of training to an abbreviated, short-course format suitable for all line officers.

Thankfully, most officers will never need to use active shooter training. But it is important that they receive some training, because on the rare occasion when a patrol officer is one of the first to arrive at a mass shooting incident, the stakes could not be higher.

There have been many active shooter incidents in the United States since Columbine, and police agencies continue to modify their policies and training to reflect the lessons that are learned from each new tragedy. This report summarizes the state of the field as of 2014. The Police Executive Research Forum conducted research on these issues and held a one-day Summit in Washington, D.C., in which an overflow crowd of more than 225 police chiefs and other officials discussed the changes that have occurred, and where they are going from here.

1. “Response to store shooting confirms police tactics.” Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/response-store-shooting-confirms-police-tactics>

Analysis of 84 Active Shooter Incidents Since 2000

ONE OF THE FIRST PRESENTATIONS AT PERF'S Summit on Active Shooters was made by Prof. J. Pete Blair of Texas State University, who conducts training on active shooter response and other topics at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center (ALERRT) at Texas State University. He is one of the authors of the 2013 book, Active Shooter Events and Response.²

Professor Blair shared the results of a major research project that he conducted, in which he and his colleagues analyzed every major active shooter event they could identify from 2000 to 2010.

Solo Entry to an Active Shooting Event Is Dangerous

*By Prof. J. Pete Blair
Texas State University*

The research I'm going to summarize now, which I conducted with M. Hunter Martaindale, was designed to help police learn from past active shooter events, so we can be better prepared for what's going to come in the future.

We wanted to get the big picture. We focused on active shooter events since the year 2000. We chose the year 2000 because Columbine was in 1999, and that event brought the sea change in the way police respond to these events. And we decided to stop at



Prof. J. Pete Blair, Texas State University

the year 2010, because when these events happen, it can take some time for the information that we were seeking to emerge from investigations and court proceedings.

2. <http://www.amazon.com/Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/dp/1466512296>

WE ANALYZED 84 ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENTS

We identified 84 events in that 2000-2010 time frame. Our criteria for defining an active shooter event were that the event had to involve one or more persons killing or attempting to kill multiple people in an area or areas occupied by multiple unrelated individuals. At least one of the victims had to be unrelated to the shooter. We excluded gang-related shootings because that's a different kind of phenomenon.


Our sources of information about the 84 active shooter events were reports from the investigating agencies, the Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) produced by the FBI, and news media stories.

If you look at the breakdown year to year, you'll see the number of events starting at a relatively low level in the 2000s and then ramping up in 2009 and 2010. By the way, we are finding that 2011 and 2012 were much like 2009 and 2010; we have seen more of these events happening lately.

Next, I wanted to take a look at where these attacks occur. Since Sandy Hook, there has been a lot of attention on active shooters at schools, and schools are certainly important, accounting for 29 of the 84 incidents.

But I found that if you combine active shooter events at business locations—offices, factories, warehouses, and retail settings—the total of all of these events at business locations was more numerous, with 31 active shooting events.

Frequency of Active Shooter Incidents by Year



Source: *Active Shooter Events and Response*, CRC Press, 2013.

And 14 active shooter events occurred in outdoor public areas.

It's also noteworthy that 80 percent of the events happened at one location, but 20 percent of the attackers went mobile. Most of the time, that's on foot—they walk out of the building they're in, go to another building and continue the attack there.

HOW DID THE EVENTS END?

Next, I considered how the active shooter events were resolved. We defined resolution as the shooter being shot or subdued or otherwise stopped, or the shooter stopping the shooting and leaving the location.

You can see from the diagram (see page 5) that in about half the events, the shooting stopped before police arrived at the scene. The shooter either committed suicide, or left the scene, or was shot or subdued by victims at the scene.


These events generally happened very quickly. The most common resolution, in the events that stop before the police arrive, is that the shooter commits suicide. What we tend to see is that the attackers have an initial burst of violence. They have so many victims in front of them; they attack those victims; they run out of victims; and they kill themselves.

That's probably not very surprising for most of the police chiefs in this room. What may be a little bit surprising is the number of situations where the people on scene subdue or shoot the attacker themselves. That's what happened in nearly 40 percent of all the incidents that were resolved before the police arrived. I think that's important for the discussion about civilian response, which I'll discuss later (see page 37). And in about 10 percent of the events that stop before the police arrive, the attacker just leaves.

"In all of the solo entries we identified where the scene was still hot, one-third of the police officers who made that solo entry were shot."

—Prof. J. Pete Blair

Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States, 2000–2010



Source: *Active Shooter Events and Response*, CRC Press, 2013.

So what happens in the incidents that are still continuing when the police arrive? You see it's roughly 50–50 as to whether the police shoot or use other force against the attacker, or the attacker stops the shooting by surrendering or committing suicide. The most common resolution in these cases is that the police stop the attacker, and the second most common result is that the attacker commits suicide.

SOLO ENTRY IS QUITE DANGEROUS

Here is something important to consider. People talk about how the response to active shooters has changed since Columbine, and officers are encouraged to do a “solo entry” if they are the first on the scene. And in some of the discussions I’ve heard, the rationale behind it seems to be, “Well, it’s really not that dangerous, because the attacker usually kills himself.”

So I wanted to take a look at it from our data and see if the situation really is clear when there’s

one officer going in by himself or herself. And the first thing I found is that in 57 percent of the cases where there’s single-officer entry, the scene is still active. There is still gunfire ringing out. The attacker is still killing people. That’s a higher number than what you see in the overall data, but it makes sense because the solo officer typically is getting to the scene faster than the cases where multiple officers arrive at once.

Here’s what happens if the scene is still active and an officer goes in. Sixty-two percent of the time, the officer shoots the attacker. Another 13 percent, the officer otherwise subdues the attacker. The remaining 25 percent of the time, the suspect kills himself.

So 75 percent of the time when the solo officer goes in and the scene is still hot, the officer is taking direct action against the attacker.

And here’s an even more important statistic: In all of the solo entries we identified where the scene was still hot, one-third of the police officers who made that solo entry were shot.

I'm not opposed to solo officer entry, but I think the officers ought to be informed explicitly about what the risks are, if they're going to take that risk.

TYPES OF WEAPONS USED BY ACTIVE SHOOTERS

I want to turn now and talk about how the attackers are equipped. Obviously that's going to be important in deciding what equipment police need to bring. Most of the time—in 60 percent of the cases—the most powerful weapon they have is a pistol. But 27 percent of the time, they have a rifle, and 9 percent of the time, they have a shotgun. So we are seeing long firearms being used by these people as well as handguns.

And in 41 percent of the events where we were able to identify the weapons carried, the attacker carried multiple weapons.

The attackers wore body armor 4 percent of the time, so it's not common but it does happen. And attackers brought improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2 percent of the incidents.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES RESPONSE

Another big issue is EMS response. The EMS national standard is that EMS workers will not enter scenes that are not secure. And that makes sense; they don't want their own people to become victims.

But the problem we face in an active shooter situation is that when one of these events happens, you get many people calling in, giving different descriptions of the shooter. So the police go in and stop the killing, and they call dispatch and say, "I've got a shooter down," and they provide a description. But the description does not match all of the descriptions given by 911 callers, so you can't be sure that there isn't another shooter on the scene.

And so what happens? Police have to do a systematic search before they can say the scene is

secure. And even after the shooter is down, calls keep coming in with people saying, "I saw the shooter at this location" or "My buddy just called me and said he saw the shooter." That kind of thing is very common during these events.

So you can imagine how long it may take to do a systematic search if you're in a large office building or a shopping mall. It may take hours, and what's happening during that time? People who have been shot and wounded are bleeding out and dying.³

So it falls upon our first responders who are inside the scene, the law enforcement officers, to provide immediate lifesaving care to people. That can mean stabilizing them long enough until the scene can be cleared and EMS can be brought in, it or can mean transporting people out of the scene to EMS.

And it can mean training police officers in triage and in applying immediate lifesaving techniques like tourniquets and occlusive dressings that help control bleeding. In my opinion, tourniquets should be standard issue with every police officer in their kit—not just for active shooter incidents, but for everyday emergencies. In San Antonio last year, we had a police officer who was handling a traffic stop when a drunk driver hit him, cutting off his leg. Another officer immediately applied a tourniquet and saved the officer's life.

OFFICERS MUST BE TRAINED TO EXPECT A FIGHT

Officers have to be ready to fight. They can't go in with the assumption that "most of the time, these guys kill themselves, so I'll probably be OK." In many of these events, the attackers are looking to fight, and so our officers need to be ready to fight.

We have seen attackers barricade themselves in, so we need police to have the skills and techniques and equipment to get in and stop the killing.

Another thing to think about is whether you are ready to operate outdoors. Seventeen percent of these incidents we studied happened outdoors,

3. **In Mass Attacks, New Advice Lets Medics Rush In.** *New York Times*, December 7, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/us/in-mass-attacks-new-advice-lets-medics-rush-in.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0

and technique, formations, and other things must be done differently. Using indoor tactics outside can get you killed.

I work with a training organization at Texas State University called ALERRT—Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training. ALERRT has an Active Shooter Response program that since 2002 has trained more than 50,000 law enforcement professionals across the nation.

And the basic question we pose is, are you ready? Do your people have the tools and the training they need to respond to the types of threats I mentioned here?

Finally, in my opinion, police and the news media should do everything possible to avoid glamorizing mass shooters. Many active shooters seem to be motivated by a desire for fame or recognition, so you will never hear me mention one of these people by name. It's enough to refer to them as "the attacker" or "the shooter."

Chuck Wexler: Professor Blair, that was very informative. Can you summarize your advice for situations when the first officer or officers arrive at the scene, and you don't really know what's happening yet—do you rush in or not?

Professor Blair: Well, if you hear gunshots ringing out, we train our officers to go in. But we always say there has to be something driving you to go in, and the thing that drives you is that you have to have actual intelligence about what's happening. You're going into the building because you can hear gunshots coming from a certain area, and you're going to move to that location to stop the violence. That is what we teach them to do.

Wexler: So you teach them when they arrive at an active shooter event to stop and listen?

Professor Blair: Yes, to get the intelligence and assess what's going on. They need to stop for a second, take a pause, and figure out, "What's happening here? Where do I need to be? What's the best thing for me to do at this point in time?" It's not just jumping out of the car and running in with your guns out.

It only takes a few seconds. I'm not talking about sitting down there for five minutes trying to figure it out, but taking a few seconds to try to see what's happening and decide where you're going.

We teach them that any time you have more than one officer who can go in, that's always preferable to a single-officer entry. But we also teach them not to handcuff officers and say, "No, you have to stand outside and wait" when they know that kids are being murdered in a school—because while you're waiting, people are being killed.

And so there is that balancing act. There isn't going to be a perfect solution. There's not going to be a single one-size-fits-all policy. It's going to come down to the officer on the scene being properly trained and properly equipped, and taking a moment to make the decision and say, "This is what I think is appropriate in this situation," and then being prepared to act.

Wexler: We have so many small police agencies in the United States, agencies with only 25 or 50 officers. Do those smaller agencies have a particular challenge with these kinds of incidents?

Professor Blair: Certainly they do. That's one of the reasons we talk about solo officer entry. In a sparsely populated area there may be only one or two deputies on duty in a county that's hundreds of square miles. It may take several minutes for that first deputy to arrive, and if he waits for backup, it could be a half-hour or more for them to get there. So yes, it's definitely an issue because they don't have the resources, they don't have the manpower to show up.

Wexler: The EMS issue is another major concern. One of the things we noted in PERF's research is that officers are trained not to deal with the injured but to go straight to the shooter. But psychologically, this can be difficult to do, to just run past severely injured people. Is that right?

Professor Blair: Yes, it's a question of priorities. The first priority is to stop the killing. You have to stop the active shooter, so you do that before you go back and try to help the wounded.

Variations Found In Policies on Active Shooter Response

PERF OBTAINED POLICIES AND GENERAL ORDERS regarding active shooter events from dozens of police and sheriffs' departments of various sizes.

In drafting their policies, some departments have incorporated certain elements from each other's policies, or from guidelines offered by state and national policing organizations. However, each policy obtained by PERF appeared to be unique, and there were important differences on key points.

Following is a summary of the different approaches that police departments have taken to some of the key issues.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS ARE DIFFERENT FROM HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Many departments' policies begin with a statement that active shooter incidents are fundamentally different from hostage situations or incidents involving threats by persons who have barricaded themselves in a building or protected area but are not actively harming anyone. The critical distinction is that active shooters aim to inflict mass casualties as quickly as possible, usually in a matter of minutes. Many active shooters do not target any particular individuals, but rather try to kill as many people as possible.

Thus, active shooter policies grew out of a need for a much faster police response to these situations. "In active shooter cases, delayed deployment could have catastrophic consequences," the Albany, NY Police Department's policy states.

Furthermore, some policies state that the purpose of an active shooter policy is to reduce the inherent confusion that can occur when multiple agencies respond to a quickly changing, extremely violent event. Thus, a policy that is carefully tailored to active shooter events can result in a faster, better organized response that can save lives.

Many departments' policies note that stopping the shooter must be an absolute top priority, and that rescuing or providing medical assistance to victims is a secondary priority to be addressed only after the shooter or shooters have been neutralized.

Many policies note that Active Shooter protocols should not be used as a response to "barricaded gunman" situations. And some policies note that active shooter incidents are dynamic, and that an incident may go in and out of active shooter status in ways that could alter the police response. For example, a situation may begin as an active shooter incident, but if the shooter barricades himself in a room where he no longer has access to potential victims, and the police can secure that room and contain the shooter, the police response should shift accordingly.

SOLO ENTRY AND "CONTACT TEAMS"

In active shooter situations where an officer arrives at the scene and can hear shooting, screams, or other indications that the perpetrator is actively shooting or threatening victims, some departments' policies explicitly provide that the lone officer can move to stop the threat without waiting for any additional

officers to arrive. The shooter may be stopped by arrest, by containment, or by use of deadly force.

And some policies note that when an active shooter incident occurs at a school, a School Resource Officer (SRO) may be the first officer at the scene who must make a decision about whether to respond alone.

Other departments require that officers wait until a certain number of officers have arrived. Those officers are instructed to form a “contact team” that responds as a unit with the mission of stopping the shooter and preventing his escape.

Some departments’ policies recommend a contact team of a certain size—often four officers—but also specify that fewer officers may respond if it is apparent that a full contact team cannot be assembled quickly. Some of these agencies caution that a smaller team should be deployed only as a last resort.

Some policies provide that only one contact team should be deployed, and that officers who arrive at the scene later may join that contact team. Other departments call for multiple contact teams to be deployed quickly as additional officers arrive

at the scene. If multiple teams are deployed, their movements and actions should be tracked and coordinated by a designated commander, to ensure that they don’t unknowingly cross paths with each other or spend time on redundant searches, for example.

Some departments do not offer specific guidance on how many officers should be at the scene before at least one officer moves to stop the shooter, saying only that those decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on circumstances.

Defining the role of contact teams: Many policies note that as a contact team moves through the location, searching for the active shooter or shooters, the team is “subject to 360-degree vulnerability,” because the shooter or shooters may be hiding anywhere. Policies offer guidance on various types of formations the contact team can use to reduce that vulnerability, such as “Rolling T” or “Diamond” formations in which a point person determines the direction of the team, two “flankers” or “wings” cover threats to the left and right, and a rear guard faces backwards and makes radio transmissions.

Characteristics of Active Shooters

A number of police and sheriffs’ departments’ policies list characteristics that are often associated with active shooters. The policies note that each incident is unique and that no list of active shooter characteristics is comprehensive. The characteristics cited in various policies include the following:

- Active shooters are likely to engage more than one target. They may target particular individuals or they may be intent on killing as many randomly chosen people as possible. Active shooters often go to locations with high concentrations of people, such as schools, theaters, shopping centers, or other places of business.
- Active shooters’ intention is usually an expression of hatred or rage, rather than financial gain or motives associated with

other types of crimes. Thus, police tactics of containment and negotiation may be an inadequate response to an active shooter.

- Active shooters often, but not always, are suicidal. Escape from the police is usually not a priority of an active shooter. Most active shooters have not attempted to hide their identity.
- Active shooters often have made detailed plans for the attack. Often they are better armed than the police. They usually have some familiarity with the chosen location. In some cases they have planned diversions or booby traps, such as explosives.
- In some situations, active shooters choose a location for tactical advantage, such as a high, protected location. In other incidents, active shooters have remained mobile.

Many policies emphasize that members of contact teams must remember that their sole purpose is to stop the shooter. It can be difficult to maintain that focus as officers encounter injured victims, but the policies indicate that helping injured victims may have to wait until the shooter or shooters have been stopped.

Furthermore, some policies warn that victims often will be confused, in shock, paralyzed with fear, or unable to comprehend officers' commands. Some victims may attempt to cling to officers, slowing their progress as they search for the shooter or shooters.

Again, some agencies' policies note that if the active shooter event is at a school, it can be very helpful if a School Resource Officer is part of the contact team, because the SRO presumably will be familiar with the layout of the school building and other critical information. If multiple contact teams are active, the SRO might be more useful as a coordinator to guide the contact teams.

Some policies emphasize the importance of confronting the shooter as quickly as possible, in order to save lives. "DO NOT waste valuable time searching areas where you know there is no violence occurring," a training bulletin from the Louisville, KY Metro Police Department states. "*Go straight to the source of the violence.* Use your senses to guide you to the location of the suspect. Go toward the activity you can see or hear. Go toward the sounds of violence. As you are passing potential witnesses, ask them for any information that might help you locate the shooter."

Repeat radio transmissions: Many policies note that contact teams will encounter many distractions, including injured victims, noise from fire alarms and school bells, and activated fire sprinklers. Police leaders have noted that even experienced officers can find it difficult to focus their attention in the midst of so many distractions. Thus, they say, radio transmissions to officers should be repeated multiple times, in case officers are unable to comprehend instructions or information the first time it is provided.

Many policies also note that officers must be aware of traps or other threats that the shooter may have set, such as explosive devices.

Off-duty officers: A number of policies note that plainclothes or off-duty officers who respond to an active shooter incident should remember that other responding officers may mistake them for a perpetrator. Ideally, police agencies should work together regionally to issue special apparel that can be recognized from a distance (such as brightly colored baseball caps or windbreakers), which plainclothes and off-duty officers can keep handy in case they respond to an unexpected event, so officers can recognize other officers at a glance.

And plainclothes and off-duty officers at an active shooting incident should immediately holster their weapons after stopping a shooter, identify themselves, and comply with instructions from other responding officers.

RESCUE TEAMS

As sufficient numbers of officers arrive at the scene, policies typically call for formation of rescue or extraction teams that locate and remove injured victims and help direct uninjured persons to safe routes out of the scene.

Some policies note that rescue teams must remain vigilant, because the changing dynamics of the situation may suddenly put a rescue team in contact with a shooter, in which case the rescue team immediately becomes a contact team. Some policies note that Rescue Teams' tactics will vary, depending on whether victims are scattered over a wide area or are in close proximity to each other. Some policies call for rescue teams to be larger than contact teams, with at least eight officers, if possible.

In addition to locating and rescuing victims, rescue teams are charged with gathering intelligence and relaying any useful information they obtain to other police personnel, especially information about the location or movements of the shooter or shooters.

ESTABLISHING INCIDENT COMMAND

Policies generally provide for designation of an incident commander who takes responsibility for establishing control of what is usually a chaotic and extremely dynamic situation. The Albany, NY policy emphasizes the importance of establishing control, saying, “A successful outcome can only be accomplished if command and control is established early. . . . The Incident Commander must demonstrate clear, expedited and decisive leadership.”

Some agencies’ policies require one officer to remain outside the scene of the incident in order to serve as the incident commander, even in the first moments of the police response. A commander is needed to control the scene, organize contact and rescue teams, brief personnel who arrive later, and keep the police department communications center informed about what is happening.

Many policies provide lists of the responsibilities of the incident commander, beginning with performing an initial assessment of the situation, including whether sounds of gunfire can be heard and whether there may be multiple shooters. Other responsibilities include providing the radio communications center with information about the best ingress and egress routes and other information; establishing one or more command posts; requesting resources; gathering intelligence from people at the scene; and establishing perimeters.

Many policies contain detailed guidance on who should serve as incident commander. Some indicate that the choice can be based on rank, expertise, or seniority. Some policies note that high-ranking officers who arrive later should not take command from a lower-ranking incident commander until they have been thoroughly briefed on the situation. Some policies state that command-level personnel en route to an active shooter event may monitor the radio to obtain information, but they must not obstruct the ongoing intervention.

PERIMETER SECURITY AND EVACUATION ASSISTANCE TEAMS

Some policies provide that after Contact and Rescue Teams have been deployed, additional responding officers can be used to best advantage by giving

them specific roles. Some policies call for officers to be placed strategically in stairwells, hallway intersections, and other locations in order to isolate the shooter(s) and choke off escape routes.

Some policies call for establishing a Perimeter Team—officers who create inner and outer perimeters in order to protect fleeing persons, cut off all roadways to the scene, and keep everyone except emergency responders away from the scene.

Some policies note that the role of Perimeter Team officers is not only to keep non-emergency personnel out, but also to prevent any escapes by active shooters. Some policies recommend that fleeing civilians be patted down for weapons, in order to detect shooters who may attempt to mingle with victims in order to escape.

An Evacuation Team can take responsibility for the controlled removal of victims to hospitals or other facilities through designated routes that have been kept clear of parked vehicles or other obstacles. Experience has demonstrated that an organized response to evacuation can make a difference in saving lives.

EMS PERSONNEL AND “ZONES OF DIMINISHING THREAT”

Keeping in mind that the safety of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel must be protected, some policies have more or less detailed provisions regarding the establishment of certain zones at an active shooter incident, ranging from “hot zones” where the active shooter may be present to “cold zones” where there is little to no threat from the shooter or shooters. In between, the policies establish various categories of “warm zones,” “safety corridors,” and/or “safety zones.”

The policies reflect a variety of local policies for EMS workers. In some jurisdictions, police have trained with EMS personnel and have agreements about responding to various types of incidents, but emergency medical personnel generally will not enter hot zones. By designating areas as having lower threat levels, police can bring some order to the situation and help ensure that police rescue teams and emergency medical personnel can go to victims as quickly as possible.

The goal is to achieve the best balance between protecting EMS workers and avoiding situations in which injured victims bleed to death because of unnecessary delays in allowing rescuers to respond. (See sidebar on Arlington County, VA Rescue Task Forces, page 22.)

COMMUNICATIONS

Because active shooter incidents tend to be chaotic, effective communications are essential, starting with incoming 911 calls. Some policies provide checklists of questions that 911 call takers should ask to ensure that they obtain as much useful information as possible. These lists include questions about the description and location of the shooter or shooters, the types of weapons involved, the caller's exact location, the number of people at the location, how many people are injured, whether the shooter was carrying anything or seemed to be wearing body armor, whether the shooter said anything, whether the shooter took any hostages, and so on.

Many policies also provide detailed guidance for communications among first responders and coordination of radio channels. Most policies note that all personnel must restrict use of the radio for emergency traffic only. Some policies note that it is important that members of Contact Teams and Rescue Teams should never need to switch radio channels while performing their duties.

EQUIPMENT

Some policies provide guidance on the use of equipment in an active shooter situation—for example, stating that handguns and rifles but not shotguns are recommended for Contact Teams, or detailing the role of sharpshooters.

The response to an active shooter at any given moment may depend in part on whether various types of equipment, such as shields, are available at the scene. So breaching equipment, shields, and other equipment should be kept “on the road, not in a closet,” as one chief expressed it. A number of active shooters have used chains to lock doors, the chief noted; so breaching kits should be carried in patrol cars.

SUPPRESSIVE OR DIRECTED FIRE

PERF's review of policies found that a few departments allow for “suppressive fire” or “directed fire” at a life-endangering threat, especially if the shooter has gained a position of advantage through height or barricade. Other departments' policies prohibit suppressive fire. Most of the policies reviewed by PERF do not mention suppressive or directed fire.

According to a number of police executives and training experts whom PERF consulted, “suppressive fire” is a term used in the military to refer to a tactic of sending large amounts of fire more or less indiscriminately into an enemy's general location in order to force the enemy to seek cover.

“Directed fire” is a more limited technique in which deadly force is aimed at a specific known threat in order to stop incoming fire from the threat. This may provide time for police officers to distract an active shooter, to take a new position without being fired upon, or to achieve another objective.

There was agreement among the experts PERF consulted that suppressive fire, as defined above, is a tactic of war that has no place in policing. A number of views were expressed about whether police officers responding to an active shooter incident might be trained to use directed fire. There was agreement that any such training must recognize that directed fire is deadly force, and that all the legal principles and training concepts that police provide to officers governing deadly force remain in effect, including the U.S. Supreme Court standard that police use of force must be “objectively reasonable,” and the fact that each officer remains responsible for every round he or she fires.

PREVENTING ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENTS

Some departments have additional policies designed to help prevent active shooter incidents, by ensuring that information about potentially troubled persons is shared within the Police Department and with other agencies.

For example, the Duke University Police Department's policy provides specific requirements

for handling reports of “concerning behavior” that come to the attention of university personnel. “Concerning behavior” is defined to include acts of violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, stalking, mental health concerns such as homicidal or suicidal thoughts, sabotage or destruction of property, and erratic or bizarre behavior that generates fear (see page 29).

AFTERMATH

Many policies provide detailed instructions for police actions after the threat has been neutralized and all victims have been given assistance, including protecting and processing the crime scene, investigating the incident, and providing or mandating psychological services for police personnel.

Depending on the number of people who are evacuated from the scene, police may be able to interview all evacuees at the scene. If there are too many evacuees to interview immediately, some policies provide that they may be excused from the scene, but only after they are identified and have provided contact information so they can be interviewed later.

Many policies call for a command-level critique of the incident to be submitted to the Chief of Police immediately after the incident.

And some policies call for School Resource Officers to conduct annual reviews of schools’ response plans, to ensure that they will not hamper police response to an active shooter incident. In addition, schools’ floor plans should be reviewed annually to ensure that any changes that are made do not increase risks to students and employees.

TRAINING

Because there is no way of knowing which police department employees might be the first to arrive at the scene of an active shooter event, many policies call for training of all officers in the skills that would be needed to perform critical tasks. These skills and tasks include immediate assessment of an active shooter scene, room entry techniques, building-clearing, victim rescue, and recognition of explosive devices.

In addition, advanced training should be conducted on a regional basis (see further discussion in next section of this report, page 16).

SUMMARY POINTS ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT

As noted above, police agencies’ policies on active shooter incidents vary on certain points, often because the best response will depend on local conditions. For example, police in urban or suburban areas may be able to assemble contact teams of four or more officers more quickly than is possible in rural areas.

While policies will vary on some issues, other elements of active shooter policies are more universal. Following is a summary of active shooter policy issues on which there appears to be a degree of consensus among departments that have developed such policies.

The need for an active shooter policy: Active shooter incidents are fundamentally different

from hostage situations and other critical incidents, because of the extreme pressure on police to respond as quickly as possible to stop the killing and wounding of victims. In other types of scenarios, such as incidents involving persons with a mental illness who are behaving erratically or in a threatening manner but are not actively harming anyone, police leaders often urge officers to “slow the situation down,” ratcheting down the pressure in order to provide time for a response by officers and others who have specialized training in mental health issues.

Unlike policies for those situations, active shooter policies are built around the reality that even a one-minute delay in responding may result in multiple additional fatalities.

Solo response vs. contact teams: While all active shooter policies emphasize the importance of a fast response, policies also recognize that it is safer for officers to assemble a “contact team,” typically with four officers, who respond together to find and neutralize the shooter(s), rather than allowing officers to respond on their own. Many policies make a compromise by calling for the creation of contact teams, but allowing flexibility to use fewer officers if it appears that a full contact team cannot be assembled quickly.

In some situations, because of the gravity of the threat and the amount of time needed for additional officers to arrive, immediate action is needed by the officer or officers who arrive first. Clearly there is greater risk if only one or two officers respond, and this should be undertaken only in the most extreme circumstances of life and death. We live in challenging times that require police officers to make split-second decisions that often save lives, but regretfully sometimes cost officers their lives.

Regardless of how many officers are present to respond, some experts recommend that officers be trained to take a few seconds to assess the situation and their tactical resources in order to decide on the best approach, rather than simply charging into the scene.

Regardless of the size of the contact team, officers should focus on stopping the shooter as their priority, rather than assisting victims whom they may encounter as they search for the shooter. The priorities are: (1) stop the shooter; (2) assist the wounded; and (3) evacuate people from the scene.

Experts on police training note that some officers seem to have a mistaken belief that active shooters usually commit suicide before they can be confronted by police. In fact, as noted in the previous chapter of this report, only about 40 percent of active shooters commit suicide. In nearly half of the incidents, the shooter is shot or subdued by the police or by civilians at the scene. Thus, policies should recognize the danger and note that there are situations when officers must be prepared to risk their own lives to prevent further violence.

Incident command: Like other types of critical incidents, active shooter events often involve a rapid

response by many different law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service agencies. Strong policies and training can help to ensure that despite the rapidly changing dynamics, an active shooter situation does not result in chaos. Establishing an incident commander and having a Unified Command structure with fire and rescue services are critically important. Rules should be established, and ideally should be agreed to on a regional basis, regarding who will take command, any changes in incident command as the event continues, and the roles and duties of the incident commander.

Formation of secondary teams: As additional officers arrive and after one or more contact teams have been deployed, the incident commander should form additional teams for various purposes, including the following:

- Rescue or Extraction teams, which remove injured victims and direct uninjured persons to safe routes away from the scene.
- Evacuation Assistance teams, which help manage the transportation of victims to hospitals through cleared routes.
- Perimeter Security teams, which create perimeters to keep everyone except emergency responders away from the scene, protect fleeing persons, and prevent an active shooter from escaping. It is important to maintain clear lanes for ingress and egress.

Emergency medical response: Law enforcement agencies should work with local emergency medical service agencies and fire departments to establish a clear understanding of how they will work together in an active shooter incident. EMS departments often have policies against their employees entering “hot zones” that have not been secured by police. A number of approaches are available to provide a nuanced approach that allows police rescue teams and EMS workers to designate certain areas of the scene as “warm zones” or “safety corridors.” Policies should be designed to balance the need to protect EMS workers’ safety while also avoiding unnecessary delays in bringing emergency medical care to injured victims. (See page 22.)

Intelligence-gathering: Investigation and intelligence-gathering are an important component of responding to an active shooting incident. Police should use online sources of information as well as any witnesses at the scene who may be available to determine the shooter's identity, where he lives, prior arrests or criminal record, any social media postings he may have made, whether he legally owns weapons, his driver's license information and photograph to disseminate, etc. Security cameras at the location of the active shooting may produce useful intelligence.

Training: All officers who could be called upon to respond to an active shooter incident should receive training in critical tasks, such as assessment of an active shooter scene, room entry techniques, recognition of explosive devices, and the roles of contact teams, evacuation and perimeter teams.

In addition, officers should receive training in basic emergency medical care techniques that can save lives in an active shooter event, especially with regard to controlling bleeding, maintaining airways, and immobilizing fractured limbs.

Experienced police chiefs and other experts strongly recommend that police agencies also conduct advanced training for active shooter incidents that includes multi-agency trainings, table-top exercises, and realistic training in the use of firearms in an active shooter incident.

Advanced training conducted in schools, shopping malls, large industrial centers, churches, hospitals, and other locations is recommended. Such training can teach officers to think about the security assets that may be available in various locations. For example, at a shopping mall, closing of security gates at individual stores can help to deny the shooter access to many potential victims, and some security devices may be operated remotely. Issues such as radio interoperability should be tested in training that simulates the stressful environment of an active shooting incident, because officers may not comprehend dispatchers telling them to switch their radios to certain channels.

Because active shooter situations usually involve multi-agency response, police agencies should strive for consistent policies, strategies, tactics, terms, prohibitions, training, coordination, and radio channels/communications systems on a regional basis.

Other elements of a policy: Other aspects of an active shooter policy include coordination of radio communications and channels, contact and rescue team tactics, equipment, preserving the crime scene, briefing the news media, and providing post-incident psychological counseling to officers.

The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents, And Changes in Officer Training

THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS COMMENTS THAT were made by some of the experts at PERF's Active Shooter conference in Washington, D.C.

Arvada, CO Sgt. A.J. DeAndrea:

No Question, We Now Train To Stop the Threat ASAP

Chuck Wexler: Sergeant, you were a team leader at Columbine. Can you set the stage for us? Looking back at it now, what were the major lessons that police took away from the Columbine experience?

Sergeant DeAndrea: I think first and foremost that prior to Columbine, we believed that this kind of situation was a job for SWAT. Patrol would contain the situation, control the scene, and contact the SWAT team.

We realized that that's not the answer. Active shooters are now seen as a patrol dilemma. We needed to get resources into that building immediately to stop the threat. That is the biggest lesson from Columbine, and since then we've seen our tactics evolve in ways that are designed to produce a faster response.

Wexler: In some ways, there was an unfair reaction to how the police handled the Columbine incident, wasn't there? People said the police were too slow to take charge.

Sergeant DeAndrea: Yes, it was unfair, because at Columbine, the deputies did exactly what they had been trained to do when a call like that came out: They set the perimeter. And we thought there were six perpetrators, which of course slowed tactics down.

Today, we are training our officers to be much more aggressive, and to get into the venue and stop the threat. We're teaching that in the Police Academy and then all the way through officers' careers professionally.

SWAT is a necessity as well, to have the equipment and the skill level and confidence that they have been trained to provide.

We all work hand in hand, but there's no question that we are trying to tell those first responders and supervisors to be much more aggressive in responding to the threat as quickly as possible.

Arvada, CO
Sgt. A.J. DeAndrea





FAR LEFT:
Arvada, CO Police
Chief Don Wick

LEFT:
Principal Deputy
Under Secretary
John Cohen, DHS

Arvada, CO Police Chief Don Wick:

*Changing Our Tactics
Is a Continual Process*

I think that Columbine was the event that focused national attention on the fact that we have a lot of school shootings. We know that our tactics evolved from that. I think that especially for those of us in Colorado, it was a key learning point, where we realized we can't do it the old way anymore.

And this is a continuing process. We have to constantly evolve our tactics. We have to understand what the suspects are doing, how they are changing how they operate, and we have to be a step ahead and get better.

**John Cohen, Principal Deputy Under Secretary
for Intelligence & Analysis
And Counterterrorism Coordinator, DHS:**

*It's Important for Officers
From Different Agencies
To Receive Similar Training*

Over the past three or four years, we have been working very closely with the FBI and others to look at past shooting incidents and search for precedent indicators, so we can provide additional training support to prevent these shootings.

We also work on increasing security at locations that could be targets and identifying gaps in security. Quite a bit of training has been developed

for the people who work in movie theaters, shopping malls, schools, houses of worship, and other locations where large numbers of people gather. We focus on training those people so that they know what to expect and what to do if an event like this begins to occur at their place of work.

We also work on issues of psychological recovery, not only for victims and family members, but for first responders as well.

One thing we have learned is the importance of consistency in training. In Newtown, for example, there has been a lot of discussion of the benefit that was derived from the fact that across the state of Connecticut, police officers receive consistent training in how to deal with these situations. So if officers travel outside their jurisdiction and work with colleagues from other departments, everybody has at least the same baseline level of training. In other states, that's not the case. In some states, officers are receiving different types of training, with different philosophical approaches to dealing with these situations.

We've also been re-evaluating the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and other response protocols, and the major takeaway from all these events is: Train, train, train. Don't just train by yourself. Train with your fire department. Train with EMS. Train with everyone who responds to these events, so that we are all on the same page when an event like this occurs.

continued on page 20

January 2014 Shooting in Maryland Shopping Mall Tested Capabilities of Howard County Police

On Saturday morning, January 25, 2014, Howard County, MD Police Chief William J. McMahon was traveling in his car when he began to hear radio transmissions indicating that an active shooter incident was occurring in his jurisdiction, at a large shopping mall in Columbia, a suburb outside of Baltimore.

Chief McMahon made a quick U-turn and headed toward the mall, which was about 10 minutes away. Other Howard County officers had arrived two minutes after the initial 911 call. The responding officers found that a 19-year-old man had fatally shot two employees of an athletic clothing store and had wounded a customer across the hall, before fatally shooting himself.

Chief McMahon and the Howard County Police Department received high marks for their handling of the incident, particularly with regard to how efficiently they disseminated information to the public and the news media as the event was unfolding and in the hours and days afterward.

It helped that all Howard County officers had received active shooter training, and that SWAT officers who arrived quickly had received active shooter training at the mall where the shootings occurred, Chief McMahon told PERF. McMahon and his Deputy Chiefs, Merritt Bender, Gary Gardner, and Lee Lachman, also had participated in PERF's 2013 Summit on Active Shooters.

In an interview, PERF asked McMahon if there were any lessons he learned during the Columbia Mall incident that have not received enough attention, and he said that police chiefs need to think about managing the response in the minutes after a call goes out. In urban and suburban areas with many police agencies nearby, it is likely that many officers will "self-dispatch" to an active shooter incident, which can complicate the situation, he said.

"As I was driving to the scene, my phone was blowing up with texts and calls from people telling me about the personnel and equipment they were

sending me, and I was fortunate that members of my own SWAT team were in the area and responding, and our Special Operations captain arrived quickly," McMahon said. "We had officers on the scene within two minutes. At first, we didn't know the extent of what we were dealing with, so you're always grateful for the assistance. I was glad that I had plenty of officers. So for example I could just say, 'Post someone at every entrance to the mall; we don't want any more traffic coming into the mall,' and there were officers to take care of it."

"But it wasn't too long before we were fairly certain that we had a double murder and suicide, and we did not have any other shooters still roaming the mall," McMahon said. "My SOD captain and I were working off the hood of my car, and I turned around and saw these waves of people in uniform coming onto the scene. So I grabbed a sergeant and said, 'You need to get a handle on all



of these people for me.' In a situation like that, you have people from various ranks and a lot of different departments self-dispatching, so you need someone who is strong enough but also diplomatic enough to take charge of them."

"I'm going to discuss this issue with the Maryland chiefs' association, because I think it's something we need to address," McMahon continued. "A lot of people will respond, so you need to manage them. It would be good to have an understanding that officers who self-dispatch to the scene will go to a staging area and wait to be assigned a role, rather than having people just do what they think needs to be done. If you have

people self-dispatching who are not in uniform, you increase the risk of blue-on-blue shootings, and you end up with more people calling the police to report that they saw someone with a gun, which can add to the confusion.”

USING TWITTER TO SHARE INFORMATION

The Howard County Police Department extensively used social media, especially Twitter, to share information with the public during and after the shooting incident. Public Affairs Director Sherry Llewellyn was on the scene and posted approximately 75 tweets on the day of the shooting. Following are a few of those tweets:

- ***There has been a confirmed shooting at the Columbia mall.***
- ***Three people confirmed dead at Columbia Mall.***
- ***People inside mall are being asked to stay in place until police can clear each area safely.***
- ***One deceased subject located near gun and ammunition. ID unknown.***



- ***No recent reports of any additional shots heard.***
- ***No indication of additional shots fired. Scene believed to be secure.***
- ***One subject dead is suspected shooter. No information about other victims yet.***
- ***MEDIA BRIEFING 1:15 p.m. near Sears at Columbia Mall.***
- ***Two victims with minor injuries that were NOT directly related to the shooting were transported to Howard County General Hospital. No other injuries reported.***

Furthermore, the Police Department used Twitter to communicate with people who were taking cover inside the mall, as police established that the shooter was a lone shooter and the threat was over, directing the customers to stay in place and wait for officers to safely escort them from the mall, Chief McMahon said.

In the days that followed, Ms. Llewellyn posted additional information as it became available, including news about the identity of the shooter and a journal that was found at his home, information about where the shooter purchased the shotgun that he used, a photo of the shooter with a request for information from anyone who knew him or saw him at the mall, information about the victims and memorial events, referrals for counseling services, and other information.

The Police Department also posted a number of photographs related to the incident, including a photo of the store after it was boarded up, with messages of thanks to first responders.

Chief McMahon and Ms. Llewellyn said that Twitter was particularly fast and effective in correcting erroneous information that other people were posting on social media, such as false reports suggesting that the shooter knew one of the victims. Twitter also was an effective way of disseminating information to the news media. Llewellyn was busy at the scene of the shooting, so she had another public information officer monitoring social media feeds and forwarding Llewellyn questions that were being posed or false reports that needed to be refuted.

“We didn’t abandon traditional media,” McMahon said. “We held two press conferences the day of the shooting and two more the following day, and we issued traditional press releases. But Twitter and Facebook helped us get information out immediately rather than responding individually to the countless inquiries we were getting.”

At the same time, McMahon cautioned that police must take care to ensure that all the information they tweet is correct. People may think of social media as being less serious than traditional media, but stories in the Washington Post and other major news media cited the Howard County Police Department’s tweets as authoritative sources. “You have a well of credibility, but one mistake and you can lose that,” McMahon said.



Aurora, CO Chief
Dan Oates

continued from page 17

Aurora, CO Chief Dan Oates:

***Columbine Was a Searing Event
For Police Agencies in Colorado***

Chuck Wexler: Dan, you served 21 years in the NYPD, then as chief in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in 2005 you became chief in Aurora, Colorado, where the Columbine massacre was felt most deeply. And then in 2012 Aurora experienced the horrific movie theater shooting. I understand that you cannot discuss the Aurora movie theater shooting, because you have a suspect on trial for it. But can you give us a few words on your general perspective on this issue?

Chief Oates: As an outsider to the Colorado law enforcement community who has only been there since 2005, I can tell you that Colorado law enforcement has been on top of its game since Columbine. It was a searing event for the police in Colorado. There was this sea change in terms of shifting away from the old strategy of “contain and negotiate.” I think everyone has a focus on the new paradigm and the new way of responding, including my organization. We have really focused in the last couple of years on training for aggressive entry

Dr. Alexander Eastman,
Dallas Police Department

to attack the threat. That is a common theme. Colorado was fundamentally changed by Columbine in a very powerful way.


**Alexander Eastman, M.D.,
Lieutenant and Deputy Medical Director,
Dallas, TX Police Department:**

***All Officers Should Receive Simple Training
In How to Stop Victims’ Bleeding***

One of the things I’ve been hearing about is training officers in some sort of emergency medical response. We have to remember that 33 percent of officers who go in solo are wounded. And 100 percent of these incidents have wounded civilians. So we must think about ways in which police officers can save their own lives as well as the lives of civilians.

I think we’ve almost gone too far with it; it has become too complicated. You don’t need a whole day of medical training for your officers. In Dallas, in addition to our own department, we’re helping the University of Texas System Police with its train-the-trainer program, and it only takes about one hour of initial training to make officers as proficient as anyone at doing a very simple task: stopping bleeding. It’s not medicine; it’s not turning officers into EMTs; it’s not making them paramedics; it’s not





making them proficient in tactical medicine. It is just stopping hemorrhage, and it is simple training with simple equipment.

So I ask you, would you spend an hour a year and \$30 per officer for the chance that one of them would go home tomorrow from one of these active shooter events? I think everyone in this room would answer yes to that question.

**George Mason University Police Chief
Drew Tracy:**

*The Thinking Is Changing
About Emergency Medical Personnel
Going into “Warm Turf”*

Since Columbine, the mindset has changed. You have to train and equip the first responders. And you have to work and coordinate and plan with the Emergency Medical Services people.

Most of the EMS people are understandably concerned about going into crime scene areas known as “warm turf.” They aren’t police officers; they are not armed to protect themselves. So they want to stay in the cold turf. But you’re not going to get victims out quickly enough if you wait.

So, one thing we do is train with responding EMS personnel at George Mason University to go into the warm zone *with our law enforcement people*,



basically right behind the immediate action team. So once the immediate action team ends or neutralizes the threat, they’re there right away. Extraction teams can get in right away. In 2009, about 80 percent of the fire departments in this country would not go into the warm zone. Now, the mindset is changing, to get into the warm zone and get the casualties out.

COPS Office Director Bernard Melekian:

*Incident Command System
Is Consistent with Active Shooter Response*

Chuck Wexler: Barney, how does the police response to active shooters fit with the Incident Command System (ICS) that currently exists? ICS is a standardized system for coordinating the emergency response to a variety of incidents, when there are many different jurisdictions that are responding. But who manages active shooter events? You may have one patrol officer arriving and taking action, and he doesn’t even have a supervisor at the scene.

Bernard Melekian: I think you have to look at it in terms of the evolution of command. When that first officer gets there, he may evaluate the problem

continued on page 26

COPS Office Director
Bernard Melekian

Police and Fire Departments in Arlington County, VA Create Rescue Task Forces to Speed Medical Care

By Chief M. Douglas Scott, Arlington County, VA Police Department
Chief Jim Schwartz, Arlington County, VA Fire Department

Like many public safety agencies, the Arlington County Police and Fire Departments began studying active shooter events a number of years ago. In August 2007, our departments conducted a joint exercise using a local university campus as the setting.

Our exercise was realistic, and it highlighted numerous deficiencies. The main weakness was the staging of Fire/EMS assets for more than an hour while waiting for the “all clear” from police. It was clear that while law enforcement had made significant changes to their tactics in the wake of Columbine, Fire/EMS had not similarly adapted.

Immediately after the exercise, we resolved to come up with a better way. That way is called Rescue Task Force (RTF), and *the main objective is to get medical care to victims within minutes of being wounded.*

POLICE AND FIRE/EMS RESPOND TOGETHER TO SAVE LIVES IN ACTIVE SHOOTER ‘WARM ZONES’

RTF consists of the first arriving Fire/EMS personnel teamed with two patrol officers, who follow quickly into “warm” zones in areas that are cleared but not secured by police. Patrol officers enter a structure or area first, as contact teams, to engage the shooter. As soon as those officers assess an area as clear of the shooter, they communicate with command. The Rescue Task Force then deploys to the same area to provide care for victims, while the contact teams continue their search for the shooter(s).

The police officers on a Rescue Task Force provide security for the detail, and their job is to constantly evaluate the situation for threats. They do not provide medical care for victims.

It is important to emphasize that the EMS personnel who are part of the RTF are not tactical medics. They are regular firefighter/EMTs who are trained in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC). TECC is the civilian adaptation of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). TCCC was first introduced to the military in the mid-1990s, and has drastically

reduced preventable battlefield deaths due to trauma in Iraq and Afghanistan. TCCC uses simple measures, including tourniquets and occlusive dressings that stop critical blood loss that can lead to death in minutes.

As valuable as these protocols are, TCCC was developed and applied for a specific demographic: The military only takes healthy, physically fit people to war. The profiles of people in our communities who are potential victims of an active shooter span a range of medical circumstances, including geriatrics, pediatrics, pregnant women, and persons with mental or physical handicaps. For our operating environment, TECC is a better and more realistic fit.

As a deployed RTF encounters live victims, the EMS personnel apply appropriate TECC measures and then assesses the situation to determine if the victim should be moved immediately to a casualty collection point outside, or if that should be done by a second RTF, in which case the first RTF moves to another victim. These decisions are the result of a constant “size-up” of the situation and risk assessment being made by everyone on the scene, with information being shared through unified command.

In Arlington, every police officer is trained in TECC. Police officers are also equipped with a



LEFT: Arlington County, VA Police Chief M. Douglas Scott
RIGHT: Arlington County, VA Fire Chief Jim Schwartz

“blowout kit” that includes a tourniquet, wound seal and combat compression bandage. This was done primarily in recognition that police officers themselves may be the victim of a gunshot wound, and either they or their buddy may need immediate care.

Moreover, when responders are faced with numerous victims from an active shooter or other event involving trauma, there cannot be too many personnel with TECC skills and equipment. On a recent incident where police were dispatched to a gang fight, officers recognized the life-threatening knife wounds that several of the participants suffered. Using their TECC training and equipment, the officers applied tourniquets and wound seals in advance of the arrival of EMS.

All fire/EMS personnel are also trained in TECC, and each response vehicle is equipped with kits that include the tourniquets and compression bandages. When the Rescue Task Force is deployed, members carry a larger version of the kits that are made for use in battlefield-like conditions, and carry enough equipment for multiple patients.

THREE ELEMENTS OF RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER

Numerous federal agencies, professional associations, and labor groups have developed guidance for response to active shooter events. Such guidelines are useful when based on thoughtful analysis of available evidence. From our perspective, a successful response to an active shooter incident must involve three essential elements:

- **The first element is the prime objective of getting medical care to victims within minutes.** Whether this entails Rescue Task Forces or another approach based on local capabilities is a decision to be made jointly by all the public safety agencies that may be involved in such a response. The foundation of this objective is to train and equip every public safety responder in the Tactical Emergency Casualty Care.
- **The second element of a successful response to an active shooter incident is a commitment by agency heads that the response be integrated.**



Standard operating procedures should be developed jointly and exercised frequently. There must be a strong message from command officers that training and response to active shooter events will utilize unified incident command as described in the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

- **Lastly, agencies must include in their program a commitment to continuing joint training and exercises.** Incidents involving an active shooter are not routine events, so there is a possibility of “skill fade” unless there is a periodic refresh of local practices. In Arlington we achieve this by staging small exercises that involve one firehouse and a couple of patrol officers who are taken off the street for as little as 30 minutes to walk through the procedures. Senior-level officers from our departments oversee the training to demonstrate command commitment.

Additionally, periodic review of practices and procedures enables changes to reflect the ever-evolving nature of these incidents. Each shooter seems to “learn” from the last active shooter incident, which elevates the level of difficulty for responders.

There is little doubt that violent incidents that involve innocent victims will continue to plague our communities. And unlike many of the investments in terrorism preparedness that have been made in densely populated urban jurisdictions over the last decade, these events happen anywhere. We must be ready.

Shooting at the Washington Navy Yard

D.C. Metropolitan Police Department: Identified Issues and Challenges

On September 16, 2013, 15 people were shot, 12 fatally, in a mass shooting at the Naval Sea Systems Command at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.

Chief Cathy Lanier of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington provided the following summary of the issues and challenges the MPD faced in responding to this incident:



Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C.

Building Structure and Environment

- Large, secure building housing naval engineering operations;
- Several Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and classified operations;
- Complex, “maze-like” layout with thousands of cubicles and office areas, and extremely narrow hallways and pathways;
- Many areas of concealment (*for shooter*), few areas of adequate cover (*for officers*);
- Steel structure (*affected the radios of some officers from other agencies*) with two, large open atriums (*affected ability to determine the location of gunshots*); and
- Alarm was pulled by security and was sounding through the duration of the search for the shooter.

Emergency Calls

- Getting information provided by callers from the 911 call center to the units in the field;
- Some operators stuck to a standard script, which frustrated callers; and
- 911 calls made from landlines within the Navy Yard complex were routed to their internal communications center and not the city’s 911 call center.

Initial Identification of Location and Access to Base

- Some entrance gates to the base were closed and locked per longstanding base lockdown protocols; and

- Difficult to initially determine the exact location of Building 197.

Scene Management

- Size of scene; both the size of the base and the enormity and complexity of Building 197.

Witness Management and Investigative Response

- Thousands of potential witnesses; and
- Coordination with many other agencies with direct involvement in the response, as well as those agencies in supporting roles or impacted by incident.

Possibility of Multiple Shooters

- While the first description of the shooter was very accurate (provided by first 911 caller who witnessed shooting), several witnesses, callers, and the limited video from the scene provided conflicting or additional information that suggested the possibility of additional suspects.

Incident Command

- Although Incident Command was established, there are a number of ways it could have been more clearly developed (after the crisis response/search for shooter).
- While most of the critical roles were established early in the response, there were various branches



and functions that were not clearly or effectively established, and not all responding agencies reported to Incident Command.

Unified Command

- Too many command buses which diluted agency representation.
- Insufficient representation of all key agencies in Unified Command.

Communications

- Some officers had a difficult time transmitting vital information over radio channels. There were numerous people transmitting on the main channel. Additionally, the structure of the building may have interfered with the radios of officers from some of the other agencies.

Self-Dispatching Officers and Accountability and Tracking of Personnel

- Numerous officers responded to scene; many in plainclothes. In addition, there were some personnel who did not have their credentials or badge conspicuously displayed.
- Difficult to determine who entered the building and who may have discharged their weapon.
- *Handling Self-Dispatching Officers:* The Forward Commander did a great job ensuring that the subsequent teams that entered the building were adequately dressed in uniform and protective vests. He also communicated with the first team whenever a new team entered. Thus,



MPD Chief Cathy Lanier addresses the news media about the Navy Yard shooting.

self-dispatching did not negatively impact the inner tactical response, but did likely create congestion on the outer perimeter.

Concern for Blue-on-Blue Engagements

- Over 100 officers, forming several active shooter teams, entered the building during the initial search for the shooter.

Providing Medical Support in a “Hot Zone”

- Evacuating injured from a “hot zone” and ensuring they are provided prompt medical attention.

Determining Who Was in Charge of Base

- Several different Navy command officials on-site and responsible for different buildings/facilities on the Navy Yard;
- Getting rapid access to floor plans, CCTV, decision makers, etc.

Demobilization

- A variety of factors made it difficult to track and manage the orderly and efficient demobilization of all personnel and resources.

at hand and make a decision that he needs to enter that building, deal with the situation, and stop the shooter. Presumably, the officer will get on the radio and advise somebody that he's going in. So he moves in and in effect he's in command, inside the building. As the minutes go by, other police officers arrive and head into the building. And you may have a lieutenant who goes into the building initially, but then he realizes that he has a broader and more strategic responsibility. So he may go back outside and assume command.

So I think that command is always fluid. There was one agency a few years ago with a policy stating that whoever was the highest ranking person on the scene was automatically in command. But that can have disastrous results if the highest-ranking person arrives but hasn't been briefed yet and isn't prepared to take command. So most agencies now have a formal process by which someone will say, "I am now assuming command."

**Cambridge, MA Police Commissioner
Robert Haas:**

*We Have Done Active Shooter Training
With Many Partners in Different Locations*

Our department has worked extensively with our community partners, schools, hospitals, and business organizations to conduct training for active shooter incidents. We train in different types of buildings where an active shooter incident might happen.

Our active shooter training goes back to 1999, when we trained at the Blessed Sacrament School in Cambridge. The last few years, we have trained jointly with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Police and the Harvard University Police

Department, at a site provided by MIT. Our Special Response Team has used the John Tobin Elementary School for active shooter training during the summer months when the school is closed. We have worked with private security, firefighters and EMS on active shooter training scenarios at the Galleria Mall. We used a Water Department site for a scenario in which an active shooter invades a business. And we have done a table top exercise with the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), hospitals and the schools.

The Police Department also has partnered with the schools, LEPC, and the Cambridge Health Alliance to build the "Be Safe" program, in which all the schools were electronically mapped and photographed, so emergency responders can quickly access the floorplans online during an incident. The planning process also updated the schools' procedures for lock downs, notifications, updated phone numbers, etc. We also have comprehensive map books in all of the supervisors' cruisers of the Cambridge schools.

Our truly innovative program is the Safety Net Program, which involves training by the U.S. Secret Service in threat assessment. This complements our Youth Resource Officers' daily activity of evaluating "at risk" children and behaviors, with the goal of early identification of youths before they reach the level of becoming a threat.



Cambridge, MA Police
Commissioner Robert Haas

Medina, OH Chief Patrick J. Berarducci:

*We Train Our Officers
In Emergency Medical Care*

Our plan is to respond immediately and make entry as officers arrive and confront the shooter without waiting for a specific number of officers to arrive. All our officers have undergone single-officer response training to immediately confront the shooter. As additional officers arrive, they will begin caring for the wounded with life-threatening injuries, and as manpower increases we will evacuate the injured to secure areas. Our officers will transport by cruiser immediately if necessary.



Each of our cruisers and unmarked cars is equipped with entry tools, including sledge hammer, bolt cutters and pry bar. We also have a level 4 vest, an assault rifle and a pump shotgun in each car.

We use the Tactical Combat Casualty Care program (TCCC) to teach all our officers the skills to immediately begin emergency care, rather than waiting for advanced care to arrive after the site is secure.⁴ The training focuses on major points, including controlling bleeding from extremity wounds or penetrating wounds to the chest, maintaining airways, and immobilizing fractured limbs.

We equip all our officers with a personal self-care kit consisting of a tourniquet and combat gauze called “Quick Clot” which they carry on their person in case they are wounded. We have created larger kits for every Medina police car, with enough supplies to care for six people. Our cruiser kits contain a supply of chest seals, trauma bandages, combat gauze, tourniquets, and a quantity of nasopharyngeal airways to help maintain a victim’s breathing.

We have partnered with Medina General Hospital on the training, and they are supplying the various medical supplies for our kits. Our lead

instructor, Brian Cavanaugh, is a veteran of three combat tours in Iraq and is the Tactical Combat Casualty Coordinator for Ohio and Indiana. Our training and equipment is approved by our Medical Director.

Sparks, NV Chief Brian Allen:

*We Have Been Refining
Our Response Since 1996*

We have tried to take a proactive approach to active shooter response since 1996, when a disgruntled employee went to his workplace and shot his boss and then himself. Since then, we have refined our in-service



training for all sworn personnel based on what has happened at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook. We have attempted to attend debriefings of national events to bring back to our agency the lessons learned from other incidents.

Regarding training, we initially taught a “Rapid Deployment” class to all sworn officers in 1997, focusing on a school environment. Since then, we updated our response to active shooters every two to three years in our required in-service training. This training is provided to all sworn personnel, and now we conduct this training annually. Members of our department also attended a variety of active shooter instructor classes to keep up on the latest tactics and methods, most recently in December 2012.

We have obtained a great deal of equipment for these types of incidents. We have purchased AR-15 style weapons for all sworn personnel. We have converted all our patrol vehicle shotguns to a type of breaching shotgun. We have purchased tactical vests with ceramic plates that are placed in every patrol vehicle. Supervisors have rams/sledge hammers as well as other breaching tools in their vehicles.

4. Additional information about TCCC can be found at http://www.naemt.org/education/TCCC/guidelines_curriculum.aspx.

We are currently testing and evaluating additional breaching equipment to be placed in every patrol vehicle. There are also a small number of ballistic shields that can be utilized. We have purchased individual first aid kits for officers to carry on their person in case they are involved in a shooting.

Prior to the tragic shooting at Sparks Middle School in October of 2013, we worked with our schools and the Washoe County School District Police Department along with the Northern Nevada Medical Center on our response to active assailants. In our de-briefing of the Sparks Middle School shooting, we found that the response tactics by the

Sparks Police Department and regional law enforcement were sound; however, on-scene management of the incident could be improved.

The Sparks Police Department is coordinating with the Reno Police Department, Washoe County Sheriff's Office, Washoe County School District Police Department, University of Nevada-Reno Police Department, as well as our regional fire departments, EMS providers and other law enforcement agencies to create a Regional Response Guide to Active Assailants. We feel this response guide will continue to improve our response to active assailant incidents not only in Sparks, but regionally.

Takeaways and Suggestions

Police chiefs and other experts at PERF's conference made a number of suggestions for their colleagues to consider in planning for active shooter incidents:

Be aware of sensory overload: Responding officers at active shooter incidents have reported that they never heard radio calls that were made. "I had combat veterans who told me they were incapable of processing information," one chief said; the stress and chaos of the situation made it difficult for them to focus.

SWAT officers are specially trained to avoid "tunnel vision" and "audio exclusion," but it takes practice to fight these phenomena in an actual incident. Incident commanders and others are advised to repeat important messages on the radio again and again, to ensure that officers on the scene will absorb the information.

Federal agencies can help with the aftermath of an active shooter incident: The local law enforcement agencies closest to the scene of an active shooter incident will usually provide the immediate response, but federal agencies will offer assistance—for example, in handling large volumes of forensic evidence. Police chiefs who have experienced active shooting incidents recommend accepting these kinds of aid, because the local agencies will be extremely busy with other aspects of the response that are best handled by local officials.

The challenge of quickly sifting through inaccurate information: Like other critical incidents, active shooting incidents typically generate a great deal of incorrect information as they are happening. One of the biggest challenges for responding agencies and incident commanders is to quickly organize the collection of information so incorrect reports can be sorted out.

For example, many witnesses at the scene may telephone police and provide conflicting or unclear reports about the appearance and location of a shooter or shooters. So it can be difficult for police to determine how many shooters in fact are present. After a shooter is apprehended or neutralized, the response by emergency medical response workers may be delayed if police believe that additional shooters are still present.

Use of social media: Police departments can use social media such as Twitter and Facebook to disseminate information to the public and the news media during and after an active shooter event. Social media also can be used to communicate instructions to people who are taking cover and may be able to use smartphones or other devices to receive messages. Social media should be used in combination with other information tools, such as news releases and press briefings.

Preventing the Next Active Shooter Incident

PARTICIPANTS AT PERF'S ACTIVE SHOOTER conference discussed what they are doing to prevent such incidents. Many noted that most active shooters are mentally ill, but only a tiny fraction of persons with mental illness will become violent. Thus, mental illness alone is not a predictor of an active shooter.

However, police can work with mental health agencies and others who come into contact with troubled persons who express threats of violence, in order to help them obtain mental health care, and perhaps prevent a violent incident.

Dr. John Nicoletti, Nicoletti-Flater Associates:

Active Shooters See Themselves As Avengers, Acting Upon A Real or Perceived Injustice

A very small percentage of people with mental illness are violent, and an extremely small percentage commit attacks like the mass shootings we're



Dr. John Nicoletti

talking about today. So mental illness is not a predictive variable.

And yet, after an incident like Aurora or Newtown, you see all these news media stories in which everyone is focusing on mental illness as if it has predictive value. It does not. If you focus on mental illness, all you get is a huge number of false positives. We shouldn't let mentally ill people get a gun into a high school, but how do you determine mental illness? Does the person have to be hospitalized? How many days do they have to be hospitalized? Do they have to have a certain diagnosis? Paranoid schizophrenic, delusional disorder? Or do they just have to be in counseling? You can't have a weapon if you ever talked to somebody in counseling? It's a slippery slope we're getting into, and it's not helpful.

The big disparate variable I see is perceived injustice. All active shooters see themselves as avengers, acting upon an injustice, either real or perceived. There is an element of narcissism. If you harm these individuals, they get this sense of injustice and they get obsessed. The injustices can be motivated by personal triggering events, such as the breakup of a relationship, or work/school-based, such as terminations, suspensions, etc.

"Insiders" and "Outsiders": I divide mass shooting attackers into two groups. The ones I call "insiders" are on someone's radar screen before they attack. "Outsiders" are not on anyone's radar.

With the insiders, one of the interesting things we find is that they had caught someone’s attention at the business or school or wherever the shooting occurred. Someone had noticed something that was unsettling about the attacker, but they had decided, “We don’t have to worry about this person.”

You often find the word “just” inserted in the sentence, which minimizes the response:

“He was just joking.”

“That’s just the way he is.”

“He was just having a bad day.”

Some of the more recent statistics we have found indicate that more than 50 percent of these attackers had broadcasted their intent. Some of them made remarks in person, and others posted statements online. I don’t mean they said, “I’m going to go shoot this place up.” But they gave some sort of signal about what they were about to do.

The insiders—the ones who were on someone’s radar—generally broadcast to the target, to the workplace or school they were going to attack.

The outsiders—who were not on anyone’s radar before the attack—broadcast indirectly, to someone other than the target.

So what can law enforcement do? Police are not usually the recipient of this kind of broadcasting. So the question becomes, “How can police interface with the types of organizations that are often targeted?”

With schools, I think we’re already there, if you have school resource officers. These officers are an excellent source of information about students.



University of Wisconsin Police Chief
Susan Riseling

But many of the mass shootings are at businesses, so the issue is how police can get involved with the business community the way they are with schools.

University of Wisconsin Police Chief

Sue Riseling:

We Are Trying to Create An Early Detection System

What we find when we look at these situations after the fact is that there was always more than one red flag about the shooter. What we are doing now is trying to find the red flags before a shooting happens.

The key is information-sharing. People become concerned about a fellow student, or a co-worker, or a neighbor. To put the pieces together, we need to share information. Universities must respect federal laws dealing with students’ privacy, but every law has a safety provision that lets you exchange information if it is a matter of public safety.

If you do good police work, when you are told about someone who may pose a threat, don’t stop with that one red flag. Find all the flags, and don’t just take what’s brought to you. Talk to the person’s neighbors, co-workers, or whoever might be able to tell you something.

When we identify someone who concerns us, we have a whole series of interventions that we put in place. And we’ve learned that you can’t just do an intervention and say you’re done. For example, if we do an intervention with a student and he ends up dropping out of the university, we need to track that student to where he goes, and share our information with the police at the former student’s new location.

We know that many active shooters build up to it over a period of years. Business people know that often it’s two or three years after they fire somebody that the person comes back to the workplace to “get even.”

In our profession we do a very good job of finding out everything about these mass shooters after the fact. We also need to study cases that may have been near misses—where an intervention worked.

Five Phases of Active Shootings: As I have studied this, I found that there seem to be five phases of active shootings.

First, shooters seem to fantasize or are obsessed with other shooters. For example, the Virginia Tech shooter studied the Columbine shooters. So Phase 1 is the fantasy phase, where they fantasize about what they can do.

The second thing they do is plan. If anybody thinks that a shooter just shows up at work one day with a gun and starts shooting people, that is not true. They think about it and plan scenarios. This is a highly premeditated action.

The third thing they do is prepare. It takes time for a shooter to acquire guns, ammunition, in some cases Kevlar or IEDs, and figure out how to put all that together.

The fourth stage is practice—oftentimes they practice. They go to the location and study where they will park, where the doors are, whether doors are locked, the floor plan, and so on.

So it's Fantasy, Planning, Preparation, and Practice; and all of that is before the first bullet flies or the first bomb is placed. Then you have the 5th Phase. Some call it the Event Horizon; I just call it implementation.

Behavioral Intervention Team: At the University of Wisconsin, we have a behavioral intervention team, combining all cases together, involving students and staff.

The University of Wisconsin–Madison has 22,000 staff and faculty and more than 43,000 students. And the entire University of Wisconsin system has 184,000 students over 26 campuses. So this was a substantial investment. But we know we need to invest in this, because we want an early detection system. We want people telling us about people at the earlier stages.

We have a team of people who look at all the cases that bubble up—and there are hundreds that

turn up each year. We don't mind getting "false positives." We want to have a system in place in which we can identify people who may have serious problems, and get people into treatment, or advising, or counseling.

Universities also have the ability in some cases to ban people from our campuses people who are not affiliated with the university. It's like a restraining order that we can use.

Over the last 14 years or so since Columbine, we have actively worked on this on a constant basis. We have put a tremendous amount of resources on detecting people who are in the first 4 phases.

In Wisconsin, we had a case last year where a man said very clearly that he wished to kill two people. He had been fired from the university, and we believe he might come back to harm people. Working with the district attorney, medical professionals, and others, we were able to get him incarcerated for six months for disorderly conduct. Now he's out, but during those six months, we did a lot of target-hardening, obtaining restraining orders, and developing intervention strategies.

So sometimes you need to just keep pushing, because there are people who are intent on hurting others. We need to be careful about not stopping our investigations too soon.

Kernersville, NC Chief Scott Cunningham:

We Had a High School Student Who Concerned Us

Chuck Wexler: Scott, when you were chief in Winston-Salem, you had an incident about a high school student who left a thumb drive in a computer at school, and it contained disturbing images, is that right?

Chief Cunningham: Yes, we had an incident that we looked into. The thumb drive had a lot of drawings about death and knives. The school resource officer started an investigation. We worked with the local district attorney's office and secured a warrant to search the student's room and computers. And we found a lot more information on the



Winston-Salem, NC Chief
Scott Cunningham

computer systems of the student. The parents eventually came to the realization that there might be an issue, and the student was removed from the public school system. We feel that we did stop something.

Chief Terry Gainer,
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms:

*We Encourage People to Tell Us
About All Threats or Questionable Incidents*

Chuck Wexler: Terry, we know the shooting of Congresswoman Gabby Giffords and 18 other people in Tucson in 2011 caused many people to sit up and take notice. You're the Number 1 law enforcement official in the U.S. Senate. What can you tell us about how you assess threats? In the aftermath of the Tucson mass shooting, I imagine members of Congress wanted more protection, or at least wanted to know what they should do to protect themselves and their staffs.

Chief Gainer: The Capitol Police have been involved in this for quite a long time. But after the shooting of the Congresswoman and murder of the others in Tucson, we did talk with the FBI and the Secret Service about whether we were missing

anything in assessing individuals who might cause a threat. We know that the majority of the information about these threats comes to the local officials. And we try to make sure that Congressional staffers share information with us about suspicious or unusual behavior.

Sometimes, a Senator or House member's office will get a call or letter or a drop-in visit that is questionable, but the staff passes it off as, "Oh, that's just crazy talk," or "We know him; he always does that." We try to make sure that they always get this information to the Capitol Police, so we can put it in our system. We need to keep track of these reports, and know where people are and what they're saying and doing. We have to resist the tendency for people to just chalk it up to "That's life."

Most of these people who come to our attention don't need to be locked up, but many of them need to be evaluated. So we try to ensure that staff members share the information with us, and then we work with our partners in the Secret Service and the FBI to do evaluations.

Wexler: What happens when you think someone may pose a threat? How do you handle it? Are local police agencies involved?

Chief Gainer: Analysts at the Capitol Police run names through our own files and through other



Chief Terry Gainer,
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms

U.S. Capitol Police Chief
Kim Dine



federal agencies that have files regarding threats. And then there's an analysis of whether a potential threat needs immediate intervention—whether we need somebody knocking on the person's door as soon as possible. The FBI will make a determination as to whether it reaches a federal threshold.

And yes, if it does not reach a federal threshold, the Capitol Police will work with local law enforcement, because some of these things are simply not a federal case. They can be handled on a local level with a county prosecutor or a city prosecutor, or the mental health system where the person lives. And getting the mental health establishment involved can help track these individuals.

It seems to me that the tricky part is that often the information only seems important in retrospect. In the aftermath of a mass shooting, we find out that the shooter has been rejected from the military, or that his fellow students didn't think much of him. But how would we ever have been told about something like that in advance? And even if we had that information on our desks, what in the world would we do with it?

U.S. Capitol Police Chief Kim Dine:
*Police Can Build Awareness of the Threat
By Educating Their Communities
About the Police Response*

One thing that the U.S. Capitol Police proactively did was put together a brochure to educate the Capitol Hill community and all our constituents about how we would respond to an active shooter situation. I think this type of proactive outreach approach is productive from multiple levels, as it makes our community more cognizant of the seriousness of this issue, and thus more likely to report things to us that we need to know about, and it teaches people how we want them to best respond during these types of incidents.

I think this kind of outreach often is done on college campuses. And I think it can also be done in municipalities, where you have thousands of city workers who need to be educated about how the police will respond if there is an active shooter incident in their workplace. This builds awareness of the issue and hopefully will result in a more trained response from government workers as well as the public.

Hennepin County, MN Sheriff Rich Stanek:
*President Obama Said Federal Health Laws
Should Not Be a Barrier to
Information-Sharing*

Sheriff Stanek discussed President Obama's Jan. 16, 2013 report, "Now Is the Time," which outlined his plans to ensure that federal laws are not interpreted as preventing efforts by medical professionals and police to respond to threats of violence.

"We should never ask doctors and other health care providers to turn a blind eye to the risks posed by guns in the wrong hands," the President's report said.⁵

The Administration later began the process of issuing Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) rules to address any unnecessary legal barriers under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) that prevent states from making mental health information available in the federal background check system for gun purchases.⁶



Hennepin County, MN Sheriff
Richard Stanek

And the President announced that HHS issued a letter to health care providers stating that “the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not prevent your ability to disclose necessary information about a patient to law enforcement, family members of the patient, or other persons, when you believe the patient presents a serious danger to himself or other people.”⁷

Finally, on November 8, 2013, the White House announced a final rule implementing a 2008 law requiring insurance companies to cover mental health and addiction benefits at a level of parity with medical and surgical benefits. The White House said this rule is an important part of its comprehensive plan to reduce gun violence.⁸

Sheriff Stanek: There was a study of the nine major shootings across the United States in 2012, including Newtown, Aurora, and Accent Signage in Minneapolis. The study found that eight of the nine shooters suffered from treated or untreated mental illness, and in the ninth case, the shooter killed himself, and they weren’t able to verify a history of mental illness one way or the other.

So that’s one point, and the other point, which the other sheriffs in the room will verify, is that about a third of the people who come into our county jails suffer from mental illness.

As we have discussed before, privacy laws like HIPAA have been seen as preventing local law enforcement from getting the information we need. I thought the President was pretty clear in his report after Sandy Hook that federal laws won’t be barriers to public information as to mental health. I think that’s important.

**Former Baltimore Police Commissioner
Fred Bealefeld:**

*Even If Doctors Don’t Share
Information with Police,
Police Should Share Information
With Doctors*

There are very few people in this room who are doctors, but as Milwaukee Police Chief Ed Flynn has said, if someone is swinging a knife around in the middle of the street, we know we’re dealing with a mental health issue.

I think the real issue is that it is highly unlikely that doctors are going to share mental health information with us. But why wouldn’t we share our information with them?

Why can’t law enforcement turn over their list of people with guns to psychiatrists, school psychologists, and others who are treating these people?

5. “Now Is the Time: The President’s plan to protect our children and our communities by reducing gun violence,” page 9. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf

6. “Progress Report on the President’s Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/november_exec_actions_progress_report_final.pdf

7. “Message to Our Nation’s Health Care Providers,” January 15, 2013, from HHS Office for Civil Rights. <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/lettertonationhcop.pdf>

8. “Insurance Companies Now Must Cover Mental Health Benefits at Parity with Medical Benefits.” White House statement, Nov. 8, 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/08/insurance-companies-now-must-cover-mental-health-benefits-parity-medical-benefits>



Former Baltimore Police Commissioner
Fred Bealefeld

PERF Summit, before the Columbia Mall shooting occurred.

I think we haven't done very much in telling about the success stories we have had in interdicting threats. We've had a number of instances in our county in which we got information about a possible threat, or the school system got the information, at 5 or 6 in the evening. When that happens, we don't wait until school opens at 8 the next morning. We work on it overnight, and generally the kid does not go to school the next day. We don't put out press releases about things like that, but I think it happens more than people know.

I think that one of the big issues is that parents don't mind talking about their children if they have a broken leg or an ACL or even a learning disability. But when we start talking about mental health issues and the intersection of that with drug use, people in the community are less likely to talk about it.

So what is frustrating for us, particularly in this age of social media, is to find out that there are threats and information circulating out there, and when it finally comes to our attention, we learn that it's been out there for a while. Parents and other adults have known about it and done nothing. We find that very frustrating.

A clinician treating someone for substance abuse will ask that person, "Are you living with someone else who has a substance abuse problem?" In a similar way, I think that medical professionals would benefit from knowing that people they are treating for serious mental health problems have access to firearms.

Howard County, MD Chief William McMahon:

Police Don't Often Disclose Successes In Interdicting Threats

On January 25, 2014, Chief McMahon and the Howard County Police Department faced an active shooting event at a major shopping mall in Columbia, MD, in which a 19-year-old gunman shot and killed two mall employees before killing himself. (See page 18.) Chief McMahon's remarks below were made at the



FAR LEFT:
Howard County,
MD Chief
William McMahon
LEFT:
Col. Danny Stebbins

Target Vice President
Brad Brekke



Target Vice President Brad Brekke:

*Business Respect Police and Will Cooperate
On Efforts to Prevent and Prepare
For Shootings*

Chuck Wexler: Brad, you're a lawyer and a former FBI Special Agent and now you're with Target. How do you see the role of business in helping to prevent or prepare for mass shooting incidents?

Brad Brekke: The business community is part of the fabric of a community. So businesses can work with their employees to prepare them for disasters, including mass shootings. This is somewhat challenging in the sense that most people think about mass shootings as a type of critical incident, but they don't happen every day, so how do you go about dealing with this?

I think we need to undertake more efforts in this area, and the way to do it is to build the bridges between law enforcement and public safety and the business sector.

I think that in most locations, if a police chief sends out invitations to discuss this issue, the businesses will respond. Police chiefs are seen as a tremendous authority, and they have the respect of the business community.

What Police Should Tell the Community

THE PREVALENCE OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS has changed police thinking about how community members should respond to a violent offender. Traditionally, police have instructed community members not to resist if they are confronted by a robber, burglar, carjacker, or other assailant. “Your wallet is not worth your life,” police officers say. “Do what the robber tells you and don’t fight back.”

However, active shooters are not motivated by rational considerations such as money; their goal is simply to kill. So victims must have a different approach as well. Some police departments have begun to teach community members to think about how they will respond if they ever find themselves in an active shooter incident.

It is important for people to think in advance about how they would respond, because the extremely high stress of an active shooter incident tends to cause people to freeze. Taking action quickly, and taking the right kinds of actions, are critical to saving your own life and the lives of others.

A number of federal, state, and local governments have produced short videos to instruct the public about active shooters (see “Resources” section of this report for links to several videos).

Some of these videos are shocking, because they include graphic depictions of victims being shot. But there has been little backlash from the public about the videos. Officials who have released these videos have said that members of the community understand the need to obtain useful information about surviving such an incident.

Advance planning is necessary because experts have many tips that might not occur to potential victims in the heat of an active shooting incident. For example, a fire extinguisher can be an effective weapon for knocking down or blinding a shooter. And if many people are trapped in a room, they should spread out in all directions. That way, if the shooter points his weapon in one direction, people in the other direction can try to attack the shooter from behind.

The videos usually instruct community members to flee if they can, at the first sound of gunfire. If escape paths are blocked, the videos recommend that people lock doors, barricade themselves in a room, or otherwise prevent the shooter from reaching them. If that is not possible, the videos urge people as a last resort to attack the shooter—for example, by swarming him as soon as he enters the room.

At PERF’s Active Shooter conference, Prof. Pete Blair of Texas State University provided a brief overview of training on these issues that he has conducted at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center.

Prof. Pete Blair:

Police Can Help Teach Civilians How to Protect Themselves and Others During an Active Shooter Event

In our training at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center (ALERRT), we note that the actions of the police are only part of the picture. Remember that on average, it takes



Prof. J. Pete Blair,
Texas State University

police three minutes to arrive on the scene, and another few minutes to locate and stop the shooters.

So for at least the first few minutes of an attack, the potential victims are on their own.

The major message that we have for civilians is, “You are not helpless. What you do matters. And what you do can save your own life and the lives of others.” Our research found that many times, active-shooter attacks stopped because potential victims took action to stop the shooter directly, or they made it more difficult for the shooter to find targets.

In other words, *the actions of civilians can dramatically affect the number of casualties that occur during an attack*. This is a message police can disseminate. We are developing training programs for school resource officers on this.

It’s important to realize that most civilians, unlike police officers, are not trained to remain calm in critical situations. The stress of an active shooter event affects our central nervous systems in ways that severely limit our ability to perceive information and make plans. I have written a book with several colleagues from ALERRT that explains this in detail.⁹ I’ll mention a few basic points here.

Denial can waste precious time: First, contrary to the perception of people panicking in a disaster, research has indicated that it is more

common for people to deny what is happening. The number one sign of an active shooter event is gunfire, but in many active shooter events, people have reported that they delayed taking action because they thought the sound was firecrackers. But how often have you heard firecrackers at your place of employment or at school?

To overcome denial, we advise people to have a simple rule: If you hear something that could be gunfire, skip the denial stage, treat the sound as gunfire, and take immediate action.

Even after people recognize a threat, it can be very difficult for them to think clearly. Police officers involved in shootings or other violent counters have reported experiencing tunnel vision, audio exclusion (not hearing what is happening), out-of-body experiences (feeling you are outside your body watching the event happen), reduced motor skills, and other side effects.

Do not freeze, and remember that the situation is not hopeless: People can use willpower and other skills to mitigate these side effects. It is important not to freeze, because in case after case, people who froze in place or attempted to play dead (a form of freezing) were attacked by the shooter. Taking any action can help restore some sense of control and reduce the stress that resulted in the person “freezing.”

At ALERRT, we teach a system we call Avoid, Deny, Defend.

“Avoid” means getting far away from the shooter. This may mean several blocks away, to ensure that the shooter cannot shoot at you from inside the building or from a new location.

If it is impossible to leave your current location, “Deny” means taking actions to deny the shooter access to your location. This means things like

9. *Active Shooter Events and Response*. Blair, Nichols, Burns and Curnutt. 2013. CRC Press. <http://www.amazon.com/Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/dp/1466512296>

locking doors, using furniture to barricade a door, turning off lights, and being quiet so the shooter will not hear you.

Often, however, doors do not have locks, and they open outward and cannot be barricaded. So if you cannot deny the shooter access, the only option left is to “Defend.”

Even if the attacker has a gun and you do not have a weapon, the situation is not hopeless. There have been many active shooter events where people on the scene were able to subdue the attacker and save their own lives. We teach civilians to swarm the shooter and use other tactics, such as positioning themselves near the door but out of sight, so they

can try to take the gun away from the shooter as soon as he enters.

The effectiveness of these principles was demonstrated in our analysis of the Virginia Tech active shooter event of 2007. In that incident, the shooter attacked or attempted to attack five classrooms. The people in each classroom responded in different ways. In the room that was attacked first and where no defensive actions were taken, 92 percent of the people were shot. In another room, where students had time to push a large desk against the door and hold it there, the shooter fired through the door, but no one was shot.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Brochure Educates the Public about Active Shooter Incidents

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

1. EVACUATE

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. HIDE OUT

- Hide in an area out of the shooter’s view
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager

3. TAKE ACTION

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger
- Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

- Remain calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating

INFORMATION

YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters
- Physical description of shooters
- Number and type of weapons held by shooters
- Number of potential victims at the location

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_pocket_card.pdf

Conclusion

THE POLICE RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER incidents began to change following the Columbine High School massacre of 1999, and policies and practices are continuing to evolve.

Active shooter incidents, perhaps more than any other type of crime, impose an extreme stress on responding police officers. In most situations, police chiefs urge their officers to exercise caution and never let down their guard. Active shooter policies recommend that officers rush to the sound of gunfire, even though statistics show that doing so is dangerous.

In many ways, the challenge of active shooter incidents is daunting. The incidents usually are over in a matter of minutes, and it only takes a few minutes for many victims to be killed or wounded. Some persons with mental illness seem to have little difficulty obtaining powerful firearms and large quantities of ammunition. And the experts at PERF's conference told us that there are no simple ways to predict which types of persons with mental illness are likely to become mass shooters.

However, the experts also told us that much work can be done to prevent mass shootings. Analyses of past active shooters demonstrate that active shooters do not simply “snap” one day and start shooting; they build up to it over months or years. And along the way, they often say or do things that seem odd or alarming to the people around them. So police executives are working with other agencies to “connect the dots”—to share

information about persons who are experiencing mental health issues, and to help provide them with the treatment they need.

It is impossible to know how many of these interventions—*helping troubled people before they reach the point of violence*—may have prevented mass shooting incidents. But police officials believe it does happen.

Police also are changing their policies, increasing training, and working with their communities to reduce the number of victims when mass shootings do occur. The most sweeping changes in this area are the new policies and practices about what officers do when they arrive at an active shooting scene. Today's police departments focus on stopping the shooter as quickly as possible, with fast action by the officers who arrive first, rather than waiting for SWAT teams to arrive. Speeding the response by even a minute or two can result in many lives being saved.

Police also are taking the lead in educating the public and encouraging community members to think about how they will behave if they ever encounter an active shooter. This is important, because the natural instinct in a dangerous, high-stress situation is to refuse to believe it is happening, to freeze, or to make bad decisions, such as “playing dead” and hoping the shooter will be fooled. An active shooter incident is fundamentally different from other crimes, and calls for a more active response from potential victims as well as the police.

Resources

Active Shooter Events and Response.

Blair, Nichols, Burns and Curnutt. 2013. CRC Press. <http://www.amazon.com/Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/dp/1466512296>

FEDERAL RESOURCES

U.S. Department of Homeland Security webpage on Active Shooter Preparedness. This website includes links to a variety of DHS resources, including training provided by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers; an independent study course for the public about preparing for an active shooter crisis; booklets, posters, and a video; and U.S. Secret Service research. <http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>

VIDEOS

“Run.Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Event.” Produced by the City of Houston. http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=5VcSwejU2D0

“Preventing Mass Casualty Shootings in a Campus Setting.” University of Wisconsin. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPyMrPz7jr0&feature=player_embedded

“Active Shooter Situation: Options for Consideration.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oI5EoWBRYmo&feature=youtu.be>

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“Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School.” Office of the State’s Attorney, Judicial District of Danbury. November 25, 2013. <http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?q=535784>

“Newtown Police Response to the Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting.” A report by the Connecticut Police Chiefs Association. December 5, 2013. http://www.cpcanet.org/site/assets/files/1144/cpca_newtown_report_final.pdf

“Improving Survival from Active Shooter Events: The Hartford Consensus.” A report by the American College of Surgeons that describes methods for minimizing the loss of life in active shooter incidents, including early hemorrhage control. <http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/06/improving-survival-from-active-shooter-events/>

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“Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.” New York City Police Department. This 184-page report includes a compendium of 281 active shooter incidents between 1966 and 2010. <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter.pdf>

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“A Plea to Deny Gunmen Their Quest for Infamy.” *New York Times*. December 20, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/us/a-plea-to-deny-gunmen-their-quest-for-infamy.html?hp>

“Behind the Bloodshed: The Untold Story of America’s Mass Killings.” *USA Today*. December 10, 2013. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/mass-killings/index.html#title>

“Rules to Require Equal Coverage for Mental Ills.” *New York Times*. November 8, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/rules-to-require-equal-coverage-for-mental-ills.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all

“With mass shootings on rise, Holder calls for better police training.” *Philly.com*. October 23, 2013. http://articles.philly.com/2013-10-23/news/43291234_1_holder-justice-department-washington-navy-yard

“Gun-control advocates see 5150 holds as model.” California’s “5150” hold for people in psychiatric crisis is being looked at by national gun-control advocates and some experts as a way to get help for mass shooters before they open fire. *SFGate.com*. October 12, 2013. <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Gun-control-advocates-see-5150-holds-as-model-4891244.php>

“National Tactical Officers Association Calls for Increased Emergency Medical Training for Police Officers.” NTOA Press Release. October 8, 2013. <http://ntoa.org/site/current-news/ntoa-calls-for-increased-emergency-medical-training-for-police-officers.html>

“In shift, police advise taking an active role to counter mass attacks.” *New York Times*. April 6, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/in-a-shift-police-advise-taking-an-active-role-to-counter-mass-attacks.html?pagewanted=all>

About the Police Executive Research Forum

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) is an independent research organization that focuses on critical issues in policing. Since its founding in 1976, PERF has identified best practices on fundamental issues such as reducing police use of force; developing community policing and problem-oriented policing; using technologies to deliver police services to the community; and developing and assessing crime reduction strategies.

PERF strives to advance professionalism in policing and to improve the delivery of police services through the exercise of strong national leadership; public debate of police and criminal justice issues; and research and policy development.

The nature of PERF's work can be seen in the titles of a sample of PERF's reports over the last decade.

- *Social Media and Tactical Considerations for Law Enforcement* (2013)
- *Compstat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement Agencies* (2013)
- *Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned* (2013)
- *A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification Procedures in Law Enforcement Agencies* (2013)
- *An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force* (2012)
- *Improving the Police Response to Sexual Assault* (2012)
- *How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming Policing?* (2012)
- *Voices from Across the Country: Local Law Enforcement Officials Discuss the Challenges of Immigration Enforcement* (2012)
- *2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines* (2011)
- *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field* (2011)
- *It's More Complex than You Think: A Chief's Guide to DNA* (2010)
- *Guns and Crime: Breaking New Ground By Focusing on the Local Impact* (2010)
- *Gang Violence: The Police Role in Developing Community-Wide Solutions* (2010)
- *The Stop Snitching Phenomenon: Breaking the Code of Silence* (2009)
- *Violent Crime in America: What We Know About Hot Spots Enforcement* (2008)
- *Promoting Effective Homicide Investigations* (2007)
- "Good to Great" Policing: Application of Business Management Principles in the Public Sector (2007)
- *Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches* (2006)
- *Strategies for Intervening with Officers through Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-Line Supervisors* (2006)
- *Managing a Multi-Jurisdiction Case: Identifying Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation* (2004)
- *Community Policing: The Past, Present and Future* (2004)
- *Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response* (2001)

In addition to conducting research and publishing reports on our findings, PERF conducts management studies of individual law enforcement agencies; educates hundreds of police officials each

year in a three-week executive development program; and provides executive search services to governments that wish to conduct national searches for their next police chief.

All of PERF's work benefits from PERF's status as a membership organization of police officials, who share information and open their agencies to research and study. PERF members also include academics, federal government leaders, and others with an interest in policing and criminal justice.

All PERF members must have a four-year college degree and must subscribe to a set of founding principles, emphasizing the importance of research and public debate in policing, adherence to the Constitution and the highest standards of ethics and integrity, and accountability to the communities that police agencies serve.

PERF is governed by a member-elected President and Board of Directors and a Board-appointed Executive Director.

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

We provide progress in policing.



About Motorola Solutions and the Motorola Solutions Foundation

MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS IS A LEADING PROVIDER of mission-critical communication products and services for enterprise and government customers. Through leading-edge innovation and communications technology, it is a global leader that enables its customers to be their best in the moments that matter.

Motorola Solutions serves both enterprise and government customers with core markets in public safety government agencies and commercial enterprises. Our leadership in these areas includes public safety communications from infrastructure to applications and devices such as radios as well as task specific mobile computing devices for enterprises. We produce advanced data capture devices such as barcode scanners and RFID (radio-frequency identification) products for business. We make professional and commercial two-way radios for a variety of markets, and we also bring unlicensed wireless broadband capabilities and wireless local area networks—or WLAN—to retail enterprises.

The Motorola Solutions Foundation is the charitable and philanthropic arm of Motorola Solutions. With employees located around the globe, Motorola Solutions seeks to benefit the communities where it operates. We achieve this by making strategic grants, forging strong community partnerships, and fostering innovation. The Motorola Solutions Foundation focuses its funding on public safety, disaster relief, employee programs and education, especially science, technology, engineering and math programming.

Motorola Solutions is a company of engineers and scientists, with employees who are eager to encourage the next generation of inventors. Hundreds of employees volunteer as robotics club mentors, science fair judges and math tutors. Our “Innovators” employee volunteer program pairs a Motorola Solutions employee with each of the non-profits receiving Innovation Generation grants, providing ongoing support for grantees beyond simply funding their projects.

For more information on Motorola Solutions Corporate and Foundation giving, visit www.motorolasolutions.com/giving.

For more information on Motorola Solutions, visit www.motorolasolutions.com.

APPENDIX

Participants at the PERF Summit

“The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents”

February 13, 2013, Washington, D.C.

Deputy Chief Brian Allen
SPARKS, NV POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Darren Allison
OAKLAND, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Michael Anderson
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE, TN
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Blair Anderson
ST. CLOUD, MN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Michael Andrus
LAFAYETTE PARISH, LA SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Captain Stephen Antonucci
CRANSTON, RI POLICE DEPARTMENT

Commander Brad Arleth
SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Special Agent William Ayers
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Acting Chief Barry Barnard
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Supervisory Special Agent
Jacques Battiste
OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATION, FBI

Sergeant Lawrence Bauer
CHEEKTOWAGA, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Frederick Bealefeld
FORMER BALTIMORE
POLICE COMMISSIONER

Lieutenant Eric Belknap
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Deputy Chief Merritt Bender
HOWARD COUNTY, MD
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Patrick Berarducci
MEDINA, OH POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Attorney General
Wayne Beyer
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Associate Professor J. Pete Blair
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Director Matthew Blakely
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS FOUNDATION

Sheriff Matt Bostrom
RAMSEY COUNTY, MN SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Deputy Director
Thomas Brandon
ATF

Senior Policy Analyst
Barry Bratburd
COPS OFFICE

Vice President Brad Brekke
TARGET

Chief Daniel Brennan
WHEAT RIDGE, CO POLICE DEPARTMENT

President Jim Bueermann
POLICE FOUNDATION

Chief Chris Burbank
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Assistant Attorney
General James Burch
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

Associate Deputy Director
Pamela Cammarata
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE

Sheriff James Cannon, Jr.
CHARLESTON COUNTY, SC
SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Steven Carl
FRAMINGHAM, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Brian Cavanaugh
MEDINA, TN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief James Cervera
VIRGINIA BEACH, VA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Teresa Chambers
UNITED STATES PARK POLICE

Chief Robert Champagne
PEABODY, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Victor Chapman
UNITED STATES PARK POLICE

Social Science Analyst
Brett Chapman
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

Chief Michael Chitwood
DAYTONA BEACH, FL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sergeant Angelo Cimini
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Titles reflect participants' positions at the time of the meeting in February 2013.

**Senior Advisor to the Secretary
John Cohen**
OFFICE OF THE COUNTERTERRORISM
COORDINATOR, DHS

Section Chief Christopher Combs
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND
OPERATIONS CENTER, FBI

Assistant Chief Brendan Cox
ALBANY, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Major Mike Crosbie
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Director Darren Cruzan
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DOJ

Chief Scott Cunningham
WINSTON-SALEM, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Michael Cureton
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief John Dailey
DUKE UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Trevor Daroux
CALGARY, AB POLICE SERVICE

Sergeant A.J. DeAndrea
ARVADA, CO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Kim Dine
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

**Executive Assistant Chief
Michael Dirden**
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Commissioner Ramona Dohman
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY

Chief John Douglass
OVERLAND PARK, KS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Barbara Duncan
SALISBURY, MD POLICE DEPARTMENT

Dr. Alexander Eastman
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Principal Deputy Director
Joshua Ederheimer**
COPS OFFICE

**Senior Policy Advisor
Steven Edwards**
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE

Assistant Professor Christine Eith
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Deputy Chief Tony Elder
CHARLESTON, SC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mahogany Eller
PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERSHIPS, TARGET

Chief Craig Enevoldsen
BROOKLYN PARK, MN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Robert Evans
VERMONT STATE POLICE

Colonel Pete Evans
BALTIMORE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Senior Social Science Analyst
Mora Fiedler**
COPS OFFICE

Deputy Chief Richard Findlay Jr.
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief E.N. Finley
ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sheriff Jay Fisher
BALTIMORE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Timothy Fitch
ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief John Fitzgerald
CHEVY CHASE VILLAGE, MD
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Dr. Elise Flesher
LONGMONT, CO DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Chief Edward Flynn
MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Superintendent Ken Fong
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**Deputy Executive Director
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Deputy Chief Eddie Frizell
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Chief Terrance Gainer
U.S. SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS

Deputy Chief Gary Gardner
HOWARD COUNTY, MD
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Yancey Garner Jr.
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Deputy Chief Michael Gauger
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Colonel Yvette Gentry
LOUISVILLE, KY METRO
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Todd Gibson
NORMAN, OK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Adolfo Gonzales
NATIONAL CITY, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Director Bob Greeley
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Colonel Garnell Green
BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Rick Gregory
PROVO, UT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Byron Gwaltney
PIMA COUNTY, AZ SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Commissioner Robert Haas
CAMBRIDGE, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Mike Hagar
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Howard Hall
ROANOKE COUNTY, VA
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Paul Hammick
BLOOMFIELD, CT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Polly Hanson
AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Superintendent James Hardy
CALGARY, AB POLICE SERVICE

Chief John Harris
SAHUARITA, AZ POLICE DEPARTMENT

Jill Heath
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, TARGET

Chief Brian Heaven
HARTFORD, CT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Sheriff Jim Hellmold
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Director Domingo Herraiz
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS

Captain Patrick Herrle
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Sheriff Melvin High
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Michael Holder
COLLEYVILLE, TX POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Anita Holder
GREENSBORO, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Anthony Holloway
CLEARWATER, FL POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Executive Director
Albert Homiak**
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

Inspector Aaron Horne
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Director Ronald Hosko
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION, FBI

Major Stephan Hudson
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Benjamin Hunter
BUTLER UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Thomas Hyers
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